Atomic Bomb The Right Of The Wrong - 1368 Words

Atomic Bomb: The Right in the Wrong Bryce K. Richards The splitting of the atom in 1917 by Rutherford [1] brought with it an unimaginable amount of rapid advancements leading up to the world’s first successful atomic bomb explosion on July 16 1945 at Trinity Site near White Sands Air Force Base [3]. This bomb proved that the atomic bomb was a possibility definitively which led to two more bombs, of similar properties and destructive power, being dropped on Japan in both Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6th and 9th of that year. Following these attacks was a huge political debate that probed the question of; was it the right thing to do?, was it really worth the death toll?, and many other questions from those on the fence of atomic†¦show more content†¦Also, x rays are capable of detecting many other issues such as cancerous masses or pneumonia as well as even dental problems all of which, again, can and have saved many lives [4]. For comparison, 400 million people are subject to x rays annually, which save substantially more lives than those of which were killed in japan [5]. Radiation can also be applied, not only to see but also to save patients in that it can be used, since it damages tissues, to kill things like tumors and other potential dangerous or life threatening masses within your body. Ironically enough it kills what it causes and for purpose of numbers, women with breast cancer had a survival rate of 25.1% in 1944 that more than tripled to 76.5% in the years 1995-2004 [6]. Also, now, 67% of women receive radiation treatment after having been diagnosed and the number is increasing [6]. But, beyond the medical field there are also economical advances that are largely caused by the use of nuclear power. These include the implementation of nuclear power plants that provide the cleanest and quickest way of generating electricity [7]. Also, to again throw numbers into the equation, fossil fuels are being consumed faster than they can be produced and the fuel for nuclear reactors, Uranium-235 , is only worth 20%,Show MoreRelatedThe Atomic Bomb : Right Or Wrong1642 Words   |  7 PagesDr. Shedd 11/10/15 Word Count: 1517 The Atomic Bomb: Right or Wrong On August 6th, 1945 the very first atomic bomb was dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. A second atomic bomb was dropped on the Japanese city of Nagasaki a few days later. This was the largest attack a country had ever seen before and there were many different views on whether the bombs were necessary or not. Like any conflict, there were groups that were against dropping the bomb such as the Wall Street Journal and groupsRead More Was the U.S. Right or Wrong Using the Atomic Bomb in ?Hiroshima?674 Words   |  3 Pagesopposite opinions about the necessity of using the atomic bomb to the end of World War II. Gar Alperowicz, in his article, â€Å"Hiroshima Remembered: The U.S. was Wrong†, the evidence to prove that America didn’t need to use atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagashaki to end the war. nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;Contrary to this article John Connnor in his article â€Å"Hiroshima Remembered: The U.S. was Right† is trying to prove and convince reader that using atomic bomb on Hiroshima was necessary to end the war andRead MoreTruman and Atomic Bombs649 Words   |  3 Pageswrite an editorial on Harry S Truman’s decision to order the dropping of the atom bomb. HARRY S TRUMAN amp; THE DECISION TO ORDER THE DROPPING OF THE ATOMIC BOMB Boom! Boom! Seventy thousands Japanese citizens were perished instantly after the first atomic bomb was dropped in Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. Japanese still refused to surrender to Allied forces. On August 9, 1945, with the dropping of the second atomic bomb in Nagasaki, where eighty thousands people were vaporized, Japanese surrenderedRead MoreTruman s Decision For The Atomic Bomb980 Words   |  4 Pagesforever. Are other countries making the same bomb? What if it falls into the wrong hands? They would have the power to eliminate whatever they wanted.† Harry S. Truman had the tremendous decision that could and would change life forever. The atomic bomb was not like any other bomb. The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, also known as Little boy was the biggest atomic bomb the world has ever seen. Truman made the right choice of choosing to drop the bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki because it saved livesRead MoreThe Atomic Explosion Of Hiroshima And Nagasaki855 Words   |  4 PagesThe disagreement whether it was necessary for the United States to drop the bomb on either Hiroshima and Nagasaki has been going on for about half a century. Many have argued that Harry S. Truman did the right thing while others disagree that it was a horrible decision. There is technically not a right or wrong answer because no one knew what could have happened if the United States did not drop the bombs on either cities. There can only be disagreements over the decisions a leader could make inRead MoreThe Bombing Of Hiroshima And Nagasaki1174 Words   |  5 Pagesnecessary or morally right to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Depending upon whose side of the argument you have heard causes one to question whether this was a morally right or wrong decision that was made. Serious reconciliation is needed due to this event, and both sides of the argument need to be strongly considered (Shin, 663). There are various possibilities the United States had greater reasoning that pushed them to drop the bombs and view their decision as morally right. On the other hand itRead MoreThe Atomic Bomb Was The Right Decision835 Words   |  4 Pageswas the first country to use the atomic bomb in warfare. On August 6, 1945, the first of two atomic bombs were dropped. The first bomb was named, â€Å"Little Boy,† and was dropped on the city of Hiroshima. The second bomb was named, â€Å"Fat Man,† (History.com Staff 2009) and was dropped on the city of Nagasaki three days later. The bombs resulted in thousands of casualties and radiation among the civilians. Dropping the atomic bomb was the right decision because the bomb would end the war, it was revengeRead MoreIn August 1945, a uranium-type atomic bomb was dropped by the United States on Hiroshima, Japan,900 Words   |  4 PagesIn August 1945, a uranium-type atomic bomb was dropped by the United States on Hiroshima, Japan, during the final stages of World War II. The following months after the bomb was dr opped, many people were killed by burns, radiation sickness, and other injuries. These effects lasted about 4-6 months. Around 90,000 to 166,000 people died either instantaneous or the lasting effects. On August 15th, just days after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan announced their surrender to the AlliesRead MoreThe Atomic Bombs910 Words   |  4 PagesDuring the 20th century, specifically the year 1945, the United States of America had two atomic bombs that the commander and chief, and president at the time, Harry Truman, knew about. President Truman plan was to drop the bombs on two of Japans cities, Hiroshima first and then Nagasaki. Truman’s plans went accordingly, which to this day leads to a very controversial topic on whether or not dropping the atomic bombs was a good or bad thing. There is evidence and reasoning to back up both claims, inRead More Drop The Bomb? Essay656 Words   |  3 Pages U.S. History - Grech Atomic Bombs Dropped on Japan, Justified? nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;On August 6th and 9th of 1945 U.S. bombers dropped atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, causing utter destruction and many deaths. These bombs were dropped as the Pacific battles of World War II were coming to an end. Soon after Japan surrendered, ending the war. But, was the use of atomic warfare necessary? Was it too harsh and cruel to the Japanese

The Importance Of Corruption In Fahrenheit 451 - 1209 Words

â€Å"A people without the knowledge of their past history, origin and culture is like a tree without roots.† - Marcus Garvey. Knowledge is such a valuable thing that if not discovered by people it can make them lose precious knowledge . In the book Fahrenheit 451 valuable knowledge that could be at people s fingertips are banned. The dystopian novel that Ray Bradbury wrote takes you through the main character Guy Montag life as he discovers there s more to than what meets the eye. In this world society had been corrupted and it is now acceptable to rebel because these following circumstances are true, people are brainwashed into thinking there are no good deeds, technology has taken over life itself, and valuable knowledge is banned. It†¦show more content†¦But that was along time ago when they had things different.† Page Kids used to be the face of innocence until they got shown some of the finer things in life such as cars, artillery , etc. So now children are afraid of kids there age because all they think is that they kill each other and don’t think about any of the good deeds. It is acceptable to rebel when society is corrupt because technology is taking over life. Technology has overpowered many aspects of life but could you imagine just by a drop of chemicals you could control what is supposed to be an animal. â€Å" All of those chemical balances and percentages on all of us here in the house are recorded in the master file downstairs. It would be easy for someone to set up a partial combination on the hounds ‘memory’, a touch of amino acids perhaps. That would accout foe what theaniaml did just now. React to me.† Page Animals controlled by the drop of a chemical, well there not even animals anymore because technology has overruled that part of life now too. Imagine instead of going to the beach you can just ask your t.v and you will be there within seconds, but is it actually experiencing things if u just stay in the comfort of your home? â€Å" Thank god for that. You can shut them, say, â€Å"Hold on a moment†. You play god to it. But who has ever torn himself from the claw that encloses you when you drop a seed in a TV parlor? It grows you any shapeShow MoreRelatedComparison Of Technology In Fahrenheit 4511151 Words   |  5 Pagestechnology, from old to new. Both Ernest Cline and Ray Bradbury present worlds that are run by technology.The technology in ready player one and Fahrenheit 451 is both bad and good. Fahrenheit 451 is all about a fireman called Guy Montag who does the opposite of what fireman do, starting fires instead of putting them out. The society in Fahrenheit 451 is forbidden from reading books.People spend their time watching big TVs, radios.Montag’s wife Mildred spends her time watching and is addicted toRead MoreFahrenheit 451: the Firemen851 Words   |  4 PagesRay Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451 staunchly contrasts these other writings; rather than presenting some omniscient tale admonishing its audience of the dangers of government hierarchy, Bradbury uses satire to criticize primarily emerging trends in society, providing an account that deems them equally as harrowing and dangerous as some authoritarian government, although he does include a limited number of strands involving an anti-government theme. This unique aspect of Fahrenheit 451 has earned the attentionRead MoreEssay about Future Concerns - Gattaca and Fahrenheit 4511562 Words   |  7 PagesPopular fictions texts expressing views of the future educate audiences about current issues and the dystopias that develop from them. Texts such as the film ‘Gattaca’, directed by Andrew Niccol and novel ‘Fahrenheit 451’ by Ray Bradbury explore futuristic societies and the implications that become of their innovation. Although entertaining, texts such as these are didactic and must be taken seriously, as they communicate messages to audiences regarding prevalent concerns and possible futures basedRead MoreFahrenheit 451 By Ray Bradbury1802 Words   |  8 Pages75 hours on electronic media and that adults spend at least 77 hours. This obsession with technology was inferred long before smartphones were created. Although it was written in 1953, the novel Fahrenheit 451 by Ray Bradbury envisions a future consumed by electronics akin to today’s society. Fahrenheit 451 mirrors the present society because it exhibits the misuse of technology, the influence that technology has on relationships, and the lust for eternal bliss. First, Bradbury anticipates the currentRead MoreAlliteration In Leda And The Swan By Ray Bradbury1852 Words   |  8 Pagesusually) (Literature: A Portable Anthology). Example: In Fahrenheit 451, Montag states, â€Å"It’s fine work. Monday burn Millay, Wednesday Whitman, Friday Faulkner, burn’em to ashes. That’s our official slogan.† The repetition sound of â€Å"M,† â€Å"W,† and â€Å"F,† show alliteration (Bradbury 6). Allusion: A reference to a well-known person, place, place, event, literary work, or work of art (Literary Devices). Example: On page fifty-seven of Fahrenheit 451, Beatty says, â€Å"Colored people don’t like Little Black SamboRead MoreFahrenheit 451 By Ray Bradbury2277 Words   |  10 Pages Imagine a society completely run by technology—robotic workers, home theatres, supreme medical care. Despite the benefits technology could provide, its flaws are masked away by the glossy image created by the media. Fahrenheit 451 focuses on a dystopian society, taken place in the future, where technology is deeply engraved into the people’s lifestyle. With technology playing a major role in their lives, the people are isolated from their world as they are not exposed to many aspects of being human—knowledgeRead MoreRay Bradbury s Fahrenheit 4512323 Words   |  10 PagesPicture a world where one must meet the expectations of being normal, where diversity is not accepted, or even worse, a detached society where emotions no longer exist. By reading the first few pages of Fahrenheit 451, readers immediately get the feeling of a dystopian society. Firemen creating fires, instead of extinguishing them, and technology that has taken their society to a whole new level of entertainment. These are exaggerated ideas right off the bat, yet Ray Bradbury carries the readersRead MoreHuman Nature In Fahrenheit 4511349 Words   |  6 Pagesof human nature. The Crucible a play by Arthur Miller, is an allegory for the Cold War politics and examines the tensions that occur between one s perception of what is moral according to human nature when constrained by a theocratic society. Fahrenheit 451 a dystopian novel by Ray Bradbury, shows how oppressive governments can never succeed in trying to force conformity in one s human nature. The Lottery is a dystopian shirt story, by Shirley Jackson and demonstrates conformity and rebellion, andRead MoreCritics of Novel 1984 by George Orwell14914 Words   |  60 Pagesimportant aspects of 1984: The setting of 1984 is a dystopia: an imagined world that is far worse than our own, as opposed to a utopia, which is an ideal place or state. Other dystopian novels include Aldous Huxleys Brave New World, Ray Bradburys Fahrenheit 451, and Orwells own Animal Farm. When George Orwell wrote 1984, the year that gives the book its title was still almost 40 years in the future. Some of the things Orwell imagined that would come to pass were the telescreen, a TV that observes thoseRead MoreLogical Reasoning189930 Words   |  760 Pagesmention the word â€Å"declarative.† Also, we usually don’t use the word â€Å"logically.† ────CONCEPT CHECK──── Create two sentences about basketball that are inconsistent with each other. ────5 Examples of Good Reasoning So far weve explored the importance of reasoning logically in situations that require a decision—either a decision about what to do or a decision about what to believe. Along the way weve introduced a variety of rules of thumb for good reasoning, that is, high-quality reasoning

A comparison between the themes of child hood in Half

A comparison between the themes of child hood in Half-past Two, Hide and Seek, Leaving School and Dear Mr Lee Essay In the poems Half-past Two, Hide and Seek, Leaving School and Dear Mr Lee themes of childhood are presented to the reader in different ways. All of these poems put forward the idea that certain events in a childs life which they will remember may not be very important to adults. A childs view is put forward by the poets. For example in Half-past Two as the child does not yet know how to read the time on a clock. He knows that the clock some how tells the time but does not know how to read it: He new the clock face, the little eyes And two long legs for walking, But he couldnt click its language To the reader, the phrases such as: Gettinguptime, timeyouwereoffnowtime, Timetogohomenowtime, TVtime, Would give an image of a child who is in the early years of their life so whereas in Hide and Seek the punctuation helps heighten the sense of being a child, U. A. Fanthorpe uses words strung together with no spaces as seen in the quotation above to communicate the sense of child-like behaviour. In contrast to this, we initially get the sense of being a child with Hide and Seek from reading the title. Also, Scannell uses exclamation marks in the narrators speech: Im ready! Come and find me!' In half past two the poem starts off a lot like a childrens story book: Once upon a schooltime. On the second line the capitals emphasise that it is the teacher talking to the child the next line says that what the child had done wrong was not important to the teacher, but was to the child. Hide and seek starts with a childs voice the child is playing a game of hide and seeks it seems innocent and the phrase: Hide in your blindness Is a typical view of the world from a childs perspective. The child is happy thinking that he has found a good hiding place and stays there for a long time after a while he comes out to find that his friends have gone and left him towards the end of the poem there is a feeling of loneliness and I think that the child is scared because the sky is getting darker and everything is quiet, the opposite of what it was when the game was being played. The events in the story in Half past two has a lasting effect on the child whereas the teacher cannot remember what it was she kept him in the school room for. The child does not know how to tell the time all the important times that he new are joined up as one large word: Gettinguptime, timetogohomenowtime This is again as a child would see the world. The child keeps waiting it seems like a story to him: Beyond onceupona He sees the period that  he is in the room as timeless as if he fades away in to nothing ever Into the smell of old chrysanthemums on Her desk, Into the silent noise his hangnail made, Into the air outside the window into ever The oxymoron silent noise his hangnail made emphasises the kind of phrase that a child would say or that one may think. In Dear Mr Lee, the voice enjoys a certain book Cider with Rosie and through the teaching and the examining has taken the enjoyment out of reading the book for a pupils own pleasure. This particular pupil has enjoyed reading the book again and again: If you could see my copy youd know its lived with me stained with Coke and Kitkat, .ua1127b2e0d43bd5c079e42938cd55780 , .ua1127b2e0d43bd5c079e42938cd55780 .postImageUrl , .ua1127b2e0d43bd5c079e42938cd55780 .centered-text-area { min-height: 80px; position: relative; } .ua1127b2e0d43bd5c079e42938cd55780 , .ua1127b2e0d43bd5c079e42938cd55780:hover , .ua1127b2e0d43bd5c079e42938cd55780:visited , .ua1127b2e0d43bd5c079e42938cd55780:active { border:0!important; } .ua1127b2e0d43bd5c079e42938cd55780 .clearfix:after { content: ""; display: table; clear: both; } .ua1127b2e0d43bd5c079e42938cd55780 { display: block; transition: background-color 250ms; webkit-transition: background-color 250ms; width: 100%; opacity: 1; transition: opacity 250ms; webkit-transition: opacity 250ms; background-color: #95A5A6; } .ua1127b2e0d43bd5c079e42938cd55780:active , .ua1127b2e0d43bd5c079e42938cd55780:hover { opacity: 1; transition: opacity 250ms; webkit-transition: opacity 250ms; background-color: #2C3E50; } .ua1127b2e0d43bd5c079e42938cd55780 .centered-text-area { width: 100%; position: relative ; } .ua1127b2e0d43bd5c079e42938cd55780 .ctaText { border-bottom: 0 solid #fff; color: #2980B9; font-size: 16px; font-weight: bold; margin: 0; padding: 0; text-decoration: underline; } .ua1127b2e0d43bd5c079e42938cd55780 .postTitle { color: #FFFFFF; font-size: 16px; font-weight: 600; margin: 0; padding: 0; width: 100%; } .ua1127b2e0d43bd5c079e42938cd55780 .ctaButton { background-color: #7F8C8D!important; color: #2980B9; border: none; border-radius: 3px; box-shadow: none; font-size: 14px; font-weight: bold; line-height: 26px; moz-border-radius: 3px; text-align: center; text-decoration: none; text-shadow: none; width: 80px; min-height: 80px; background: url(https://artscolumbia.org/wp-content/plugins/intelly-related-posts/assets/images/simple-arrow.png)no-repeat; position: absolute; right: 0; top: 0; } .ua1127b2e0d43bd5c079e42938cd55780:hover .ctaButton { background-color: #34495E!important; } .ua1127b2e0d43bd5c079e42938cd55780 .centered-text { display: table; height: 80px; padding-left : 18px; top: 0; } .ua1127b2e0d43bd5c079e42938cd55780 .ua1127b2e0d43bd5c079e42938cd55780-content { display: table-cell; margin: 0; padding: 0; padding-right: 108px; position: relative; vertical-align: middle; width: 100%; } .ua1127b2e0d43bd5c079e42938cd55780:after { content: ""; display: block; clear: both; } READ: The Inside Of Raymond'S Run EssayThe voice is writing to the author of her favourite book Laurie Lee and is apologising because she failed the exam the voice did not like the lesson English until she read Cider with Rosie. This pupil does not like any of the other authors or novelists such as Shakespeare etc. The irony about this poem is that this poem is an examination piece of literature. In Leaving School the voice is a child that is about to start a new school. This poem presents the disappointment and the unhappiness that children remember but again remain irrelevant to adults. Before starting the new school the child is looking forward to going there and they think that its going to be fun: I thought it was going to be fun The child sees this event as a life changing moment: I was eight when I set out in to the world wearing a grey flannel suit / I had my own suit case The child is very grown up has a flannel suit for instance and has his own suitcase the school that he is going to is a boarding school and seem to be very strict and treat the children like adults. All of the above poems have similarities about them such as they are all about childhood but there are also many differences about them such as Hide and seek is about the fun side of childhood and Leaving School is about the scared part and the unhappiness in childhood, Half-past Two is about children that are to scared to ask teachers because they have been told off. Dear Mr Lee is about the curriculum taking the enjoyment out of reading books that are in the syllabus even if out peoples own accord.

Stakeholder Theory Ethical Management - Free Samples to Students

Question: Discuss about the Stakeholder Theory Ethical Management. Answer: Introduction Stakeholders form an essential part of the organization. Their interest has to be taken care of. For this, tools such as stakeholder`s analysis are used. The report throws light on the stakeholder analysis of Royal Ascot with special reference to the Power/ Interest Matrix. A stakeholder can be defined as an individual, organization, social groups or the society, which has a stake in the business or the efficiency of a business. Stakeholders can be from the internal as well as the external environment of the business (Ferretti 2016). A stake can be described as vital interest in the business or the activities. It can vary from ownership and property interests to legal interests and obligations including moral rights Stakeholder analysis in the business domain can be defined as a process of understanding and identifying the impact of a decision on the relevant party. This information comes useful in assessing the interest of the stakeholders and how they should be addressed in the planning, policies, programs and other actions relevant to a business (Bottero Mondini and Datola 2017). Stakeholder analysis forms a primary component of stakeholder management. In a stakeholder analysis, the procedure comprises of balancing, weighing and measuring the various demands placed on the firm by the particular stakeholders having a stake in the particular issue or a problem. In this analysis, the aim is to keep the interests of stakeholders in vision and compensate those who have been affected. The stakeholder`s attitudes can be assessed regularly to track their changes using a stakeholder`s analysis (Mindtools.com 2017). The benefits of this include-Identification of risks and identification of primary stak eholders who affect the business adversely. Stake holders of Royal Ascot Race goers- These are the people who attend the race meetings regularly. Employees- These include the managing staffs who manage the various events that take place at Royal Ascot. Royal Ascot conducts various events like weddings and conferences. Jockey- They is the ones who handle the horses. Their interest is of extreme importance. Caterer- Royal Ascot has appointed a single caterer since 1998 named - Sodexo Prestige. During the races there are 39 kitchens operating for delicacy. Outside vendors or suppliers- There are various suppliers like bars and food outlets around the racecourse who are dependent on the welfare of the events of Royal Ascot (Ascot.co.uk. 2017). Temporary hospitality staff- During the races various staff members are hired on temporary basis for cleaning, catering and maintenance purposes. Sponsors- These are the primary stakeholders who sponsor the event Government entity- Royal Ascot has to abide by certain rules and regulations for ease of functioning Visitors- Visitors include first time visitors, wedding party and other event members The royal family- The royal family opens the race in June every year. They are the primary reason behind the huge crowd. Interest of the Stakeholders of Royal Ascot Race goers-There satisfaction depends on the success and management of the races. Employees- The employees have an internal stake in the success of the company. Their livelihood depends on these events. Jockey-If the jockeys are not pleased, they can spoil the show. Caterer- The caterers would like the maximum crowd pull to increase their sales. Outside vendors or suppliers- The outside vendors, set up food counters and stalls for the people who visit the races. The suppliers tend to provide various equipments required, hence they have a considerable stale in the success of the event Temporary hospitality staff- The temporary staff is present during the peak seasons. They tend to perform tasks when the crowd pull is the highest. There employment depends on the success of the races (Ascot.co.uk. 2017). Sponsors-the sponsors would like to have maximum return for the investment. Government entity- The government aims at the welfare of the people. It requires the law and order to be maintained. Visitors- They is the customers and their needs must be met primarily. The royal family- The royal family is the primary stakeholder. Their name is associated with the brand. Hence, they would want it to be conducted ethically and efficiently. Power/ Interest Matrix When managing a project, the interest of various stakeholders needs to be considered. However, not all stakeholders are equal (Horton and Pilkington 2014). Some stakeholders are more important than others are and need to be dealt with accordingly. In order to understand which stakeholder needs maximum attention, a power/ interest matrix is used. A power/ interest Matrix, also known as Power/ Interest grid, are a management tool, which helps the managers to categorize the stakeholders in order of increasing power and interest in a project. This tool helps the firm to focus on the key stakeholders who can turn a venture into a success or a failure. In simple terms, the matrix helps in stakeholder prioritization (Andriof et al. 2017) The process involves documenting the interest and motivations of the stakeholders, identifying the conflict among the different stakeholders. It also involves identifying the relationship between the stakeholders and determining the level of involvement required from each stakeholder for a particular project. Use of this matrix, the firm can determine the stakeholders who need close management and those who need minimum management. This tool thus, helps the firm in channeling their time and energy on the stakeholders who have the highest interest and most power in the venture`s success. The Power/ Interest Matrix is the second step of the Stakeholder Matrix, where each stakeholder`s contribution and importance is identified and plotted against the matrix ranging from the power to interest (Weiss 2014). The ones with high power and high interest need to be managed closely and the ones with low power and low interest need to be managed with minimum effort. Power/ Matrix Analysis of the stakeholders of Royal Ascot The power/ interest matrix has been done in the excel sheet attached. The kind of influence of each stakeholder has been explained below: Race-goers- They belong to the high power, low interest quadrant. These are cautious stakeholders. They have high power because they are the main customers of the races. Their presence is important to the event. They need to be kept satisfied. Employees- The employees belong to the high power, high interest quadrant. They are the main backbone of the organization and their participation is crucial for the welfare of the events. They need to be managed closely Caterers- They belongs to the high interest, low power quadrant. They have high interest in the welfare of the organization; however, the power is not as high. This group needs to be well informed about the actions and operations. Vendors and suppliers- They belong to the same matrix as the caterers. This group needs to be well informed and their interest stake is high. Temporary staff- They belong to the lowest quadrant as they have low interest and low power. They can be easily replaced and therefore their stake needs to be monitored. Sponsors- They belongs to the most valuable quadrant with high power as well as high interest. They are the source of funds for the events and need to be managed closely for the success of the events as well as the organization. Government entity- They have been placed in the high power but low interest quadrant because their interest in the welfare o the organization is not very high. However, they have adequate power, which is essential (Harrison, Freeman and de Abreu 2015). Visitors- These are the visitors who are not that regular in attending the events, their power is high, but their interest in the events is not adequate. Royal Family- The royal family belongs to the respective quadrant because of their high power in the society, however, their interest in the event is not enough. Jockey- The jockey`s are the key drivers of the event. They are often ignored but must be managed closely. Conclusion Therefore, from the discussion it can be concluded that stakeholder analysis is an important study, which should be undertaken regularly to monitor and understand the needs of the stakeholders. Royal Ascot has various stakeholders, who need to be managed accordingly by making use of the Power/Interest Matrix given. Reference List Andriof, J., Waddock, S., Husted, B. and Rahman, S.S., 2017.Unfolding stakeholder thinking: theory, responsibility and engagement. Routledge Ascot.co.uk. ,2017.Ascot Racecourse | Royal Ascot Horse Racing | Home. [online] Available at: https://www.ascot.co.uk/ [Accessed 17 Nov. 2017]. Bottero, M., Mondini, G. and Datola, G., 2017. Decision-making tools for urban regeneration processes: from Stakeholders Analysis to Stated Preference Methods.Tema. Journal of Land Use, Mobility and Environment,10(2), pp.193-212. Ferretti, V., 2016. From stakeholders analysis to cognitive mapping and Multi-Attribute Value Theory: An integrated approach for policy support.European Journal of Operational Research,253(2), pp.524-541. Harrison, J.S., Freeman, R.E. and de Abreu, M.C.S., 2015. Stakeholder theory as an ethical approach to effective management: Applying the theory to multiple contexts.Revista Brasileira de Gesto de Negcios,17(55), p.858. Horton, L. and Pilkington, A., 2014. Rolling Back from the Power/interest Matrix: A New Approach for Role Based Stakeholder Engagement in Projects. Mindtools.com ,2017.Stakeholder Analysis: Winning Support for Your Projects. [online] Mindtools.com. Available at: https://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newPPM_07.htm [Accessed 17 Nov. 2017]. Weiss, J.W., 2014.Business ethics: A stakeholder and issues management approach. Berrett-Koehler Publishers.

LA Phil Concert Mozarts Requiem at Hollywood Bowl by Los Angeles Philharmonic free essay sample

I would like to play Mozart’s Requiem at my wedding. (My mother said that she would approve of any person who would agree with this request.) Although the Requiem has a decidedly dark tone, the piece, written by Mozart on his deathbed, emanates with lively energy, awakening all who listen to it. My introduction to Mozart’s Requiem was many years ago when I watched Amadeus. I developed an obsession with this piece, repeatedly listening to the Berlin Philharmonic’s recording, featuring soprano Anna Tomowa-Sintow. When I saw it was on the Los Angeles Philharmonic’s season calendar in August 2017—featuring Gustavo Dudamel as the conductor— I lobbied my mother to let me see it (and forced her to take me on the 2-hour round trip to the Hollywood Bowl on a school night). As the concert approached, I listened to the Kyrie movement ten times a day, studying the structure of the movement. We will write a custom essay sample on LA Phil Concert: Mozarts Requiem at Hollywood Bowl by Los Angeles Philharmonic or any similar topic specifically for you Do Not WasteYour Time HIRE WRITER Only 13.90 / page I was very excited for this concert. The concert began, not with Mozart, but with Harmonium, a choral piece composed by John Adams in 1980. John Adams is a postmodernist minimalist composer, similar in style to composers Philip Glass and Steven Reich. Harmonium is written like a choral symphony, and is a background to three poems, corresponding to its three movements. The first movement, â€Å"Negative Love,† is based on the poem by John Donne and begins softly with an ethereal mood. Dudamel conducted this restrained piece in a reserved way, his baton keeping him in check. Although â€Å"Negative Love,† like the rest of Harmonium could be mistaken for ambient music, it creates a mysterious mood and possesses sufficient musical merit and complexity to avoid this label. Based on poems by Emily Dickinson, the following movements, â€Å"Because I Could Not Stop for Death† and â€Å"Wild Nights,† were similar in timbre, rhythm and varied mostly in volume. John Adams presented himself to the audie nce at the end of the first half and received the applause of the crowd, a nice reminder that all composers from all time periods were living breathing human beings at one point. That is, not all composers are dead. Next came the Requiem, the star of this show. The Requiem Mass was Mozart’s final work, as he died during its composition. Completed posthumously by Franz Sussmayr, one of Mozart’s pupils, Mozart’s Requiem is reminiscent of Baroque Cantatas, particularly in the fugal Kyrie movement. However, the Requiem is distinctly Classical for the majority of the work, with an overall homophonic texture and the key and rhythmic changes characteristic of this period. Softly, with a ,slow tempo, the Requiem began in the key of D Minor. The Introit – Requiem movement began with low strings and woodwinds. Building gradually, the chorus joined in, with a solo by the soprano, Miah Persson. Building to a climax, the movement then softened, and concludes. Dudamel let go of all restraint and dropped his baton for this second half, conducting solely using his passionate body motions. Next came my favorite movement. Kyrie is a choral double fugue with a lively tempo written in duple meter. This movement began with the words â€Å"Kyrie Eleison,† the primary six note subject of the fugue, followed by the secondary subject â€Å"Christie Eleison,† a fast ascending conjunctive phrase that rings out distinctively. This movement alternated between strings and chorus singing the subjects, with extreme kinetic energy. The sound of the LA Phil possessed a distinctive and agitated timbre. In the middle of the movement, the key of the subject changed to major, and built in volume and complexity. This movement ended with a loud subject, before continuing onto the Dies Irae movement. This movement, full of fire, ended with the tempo slowing, timbres becoming less harsh, and the whole character changing. The piece then moved into a call-and-response section with many bass and tenor voices. The movements progressed with similar texture and timbre, with the Lacrimosa section, and the Offertorium movement, before returning to a recapitulation of the Introit. After these inner sections, we returned to the Communio section, a repeat of the Requiem Aeternam and the Kyrie fugue. This piece ended grandly, leaving me full of awe with a bit of sorrow as the concert had come to an end. In reflection, the pairing of Harmonium by John Adams (1980), a contemporary minimalistic composer, and Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart’s Requiem Mass K.62 was an inspired choice. Both are choral works broken into short sections; both are meditations on death. In this way, Harmonium is a contemporary Requiem and a fresh compliment to Mozart’s Requiem. Having loved Mozart’s Requiem for many years, and having seen it once before (at the London’s Academy of St. Martin in the Fields in 2014), I was amazed at the quality and awe-inspiring nature of this piece and the Los Angeles Philharmonic, and I found Dudamel’s passionate interpretation of this marvelous work to be absolutely fantastic. I hope to see both Mozart’s Requiem and Dudamel in concert again in the future. After all, I have become even more convinced that I would like to play Mozart’s Requiem at my wedding.

Our Town Essays - English-language Films, Our Town, Thornton Wilder

Our Town Essays - English-language Films, Our Town, Thornton Wilder Our Town The book Our Town is a play written by Thorton Wilder in 1938. The play uses very little props and makes the audience use their imagination. People all are very different but they all experience the same things. The daily life is mostly the same for all people across the world. In the play Ms. Gibbs wakes up the kids. She makes them breakfast and packs their lunch. The Greeks did the same for their kids. Also in the play, the letter that Jane Crowfort got was addressed to the world, the universe, and everything in gods mind. That proves that Wilder is trying to state that everyone goes through waking their kids up and fixing them breakfast. Another thing that most people go through or experience is love and marriage. In this part of the play Wilder uses flashbacks to show how this happened. George is scared of growing up and getting married to Emily. His mom, Ms. Gibbs, said that when Doc Gibbs and her were getting married they felt that they wouldn?t have nothing to talk about. In the beginning of Act II the stage manager says ? Almost everybody in the world gets married-you know what I mean( Wilder 535). That is how Wilder states that everyone experiences love and marriage. People take life for granted while they live and do not appreciate life until they are gone. In this act Wilder lets Emily go back in time. Ms. Gibbs told Emily to go to the least important day of her life. Emily went to her twelve birthday. When she arrived at her house she was overwhelmed of how her mom looked at that age. Emily wanted her mom to look into her eyes for one last time. Ms. Gibbs didn?t so Emily went back to the grave yard. Emily told her mom that they don?t understand. Ms. Gibbs said that they don?t. They were talking about living don?t understand about life until they are dead. All three acts are about common experiences that everyone goes through. Wilder named the play Our Town because it could happen in any town in the world. Wilder says ?an attempt to find a value above all price for the smallest event in our daily life.?( Wilder Notes n.p.). This means that we all experience the same things in life, no matter what it is.

Theme Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words

Theme - Essay Example The immigrant experience is marked by the narrator of the last section who notes that life is smooth, though challenging. According to Lila’s parents, the movement to America presents them an opportunity for wealth which they would have not obtained in India. Nonetheless, Mrs. Sen flat-out refuses to assimilate due to her incapability to live without Indian life. In this scenario, marriage is an opportunity for happiness but also secrets and mysteries. Twinkle and Sanjeev have no arrangement in their marriage even though they are born in America. Despite of being together in marriage, each individual maintains  self feelings. Sanjeev is uncertain of love for his wife because of the disconnection. The toll of the child’s death moves Shukumar and Shoba’s marriage radically2. The two are no longer the same people as they met due to death and their attitudes are altered by the death. Hence, each romantic instance poses as a unique aspect in its own way. The author highlights the essence of communication. The author highlights the effect of secrecy in marriage and entails numerous feelings that can attribute to break up. For 3instance, Shukumar and Shoba got deprived of their own grief and halted communication with each other. The two have gained mistrust and can hardly believe that their union is still valid. The blackout enables Shukumar and Shoba to communicate the secrets, which they have never shared to each other. There is evident highlight of parent and child relations. The children’s relations change with their parents as they grow due to understanding they develop. There is an automatic truth between Eliot and the mother. Eliot is certain of his mother’s distress and his powerlessness over the situation. In contrast, the narrator nurses his mother when she becomes ill. Lilia, Eliot, and Rohin all recognize the grownups grief and offer high-level surveillance on the form of love and

Family Ties Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words

Family Ties - Essay Example We all know how important family ties are for people and how needful it is, to have someone close enough to support and understand you in any situation. Either parent in childhood or a spouse in the adult life is those who would never leave or betray. To my thinking, marriage ties are the strong connection between people similar to the connection existing between parents and children. As one begins his/her life journey and starts living separately from parents, a wife or a husband may become the most precious soul mate to accompany and help throughout one's life. People do not bear soul mates, they become soul mates, and it is the great happiness, to find such a soul mate. To me, my wife is the person I can always rely on, the person I can fully trust. And marriage is not a mere word for us. We are used to supporting and complementing each other, and living apart would be very hard and unhappy for both of us, especially living in different countries. I would like to be near her both in happy and sad moments and help her overcome all the hardships. This is what I promised to do when I married her. People say that when people love their souls come in touch with each other until they become a single whole. I am sure a husband and a wife have one soul for two, and tearing his soul apart would be very painful for both. Living alone without my wife here will be extremely hard for me: I am a man, and I want to be a tower of strength for the woman who is the dearest person to me.

Vark learning style Research Paper Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

Vark learning style - Research Paper Example Nilson (2010) said that the VARK (visual, aural, read/write, and kinesthetic) learning style assessment emphasizes on learning styles that utilize an individual’s senses (sight, touch, hearing). Fleming and Mills (1992) were the ones who came up with these classifications that mirror their students’ knowledge, involvement, and encounter when it comes to learning. According to Fleming (2011), individuals’ learning preferences are respectively assessed in the VARK Learning Style Questionnaire. Information being portrayed in symbols, colors, and other means like pie charts and fish diagrams can be readily absorbed by a student with a high visual preference. Those who score high in the aural mode can better recognize information via verbal means or other forms of audible media. For them, their sense of hearing is quite utilized in understanding data. Learners who received high results in their reading and writing category may pick up facts best when these are express ed in written words. As its category suggests, a person in this mode may prefer reading texts a lot as well as writing them. In the kinesthetic learning preference, a person’s experience is crucial in indicating his learning progress. Students in this mode would like to move and practice the concepts so they can better grasp the ideas being presented to them. For this group, experience is indeed the best mentor. The results in this questionnaire can reveal a person’s potential in learning.... Nowadays, almost anything can be accomplished with just a lift of a finger or a push of a button. Information that could be communicated in an hour through lecture can be depicted through multimedia in just 5 minutes. This kind of scenario is invading homes and minds of people. When individuals enter the classroom, many of them get uninterested especially when the teacher merely employs a single mode of instruction. Many students may get perked up when there is an involvement of power point presentations with relevant videos or pictures. Other learners feel that they can actually learn more when experience is incorporated into the discussion. Each student may have his own unique way of learning. As an example, there is a student who gained a percentage of 13 in visual, kinesthetic, as well as reading and writing. He got a percentage of 8 in the aural category. Using VARK, stability may be acquired by encouraging an educator to utilize different kinds of strategies and materials to ad dress the varied preferences of young minds. The student in this situation may help himself by incorporating techniques in his studying lifestyle. Since this person is noticeably multimodal, he may prefer understanding the lesson with the use of pictures and other figures, word games and mnemonics, including different kinds of movement. For instance, he can draw symbols on the side of his notes to give him a clue regarding the topic’s essence. He can also come up with acronyms to help him enumerate certain processes. Walking while memorizing or practicing a speech may also be beneficial. Analysis People do not need to be bothered for a long time with this kind of assessment. Since this type of questionnaire just employs a few items, it can be quickly answered.

Decentralization and Democratization in Indonesia

Decentralization and Democratization in Indonesia Chapter Six Lessons and Implications The changes in Indonesia have been incrementalWe still have the New Order, or most of it. Anyway, the corrosive parts are still reigning in. We have a new administration but the New Order keeps coming back in various ways. Dwight T. King[1] It is a paradox that, in an era when democracy seems to have emerged as the single most acceptable form of political organization, more and more people in both mature and young democracies are disengaging from the political process. Knight, Chigudu Tandon (2002) †¦a breakdown of an authoritarian regime may be reversed†¦even if democracy is established, it need not be consolidated. Under certain conditions, democratic institutions may systematically generate outcomes that cause some politically important forces to opt for authoritarianism. Hence, consolidated democracy is only one among the possible outcomes of breakdown of authoritarian regimes. Pzeworski (1991: 51) Introduction The discussion in previous chapters provides a foundation for important theoretical insights regarding the nature and the significance of decentralization in Indonesia, as well as its relation to democratization in the regions. I have emphasized how decentralization practices in the regions promote popular participation in local political processes beyond electoral participation. By and large, the experiences of Bandung District and City of Cirebon in implementing decentralization between 1945 and 2006 lend support to the argument that decentralization does not necessarily lead to the growth of local democracy within which local ordinary people are able to exert their power to significantly influence local decision-making process. Although promoting democracy has become one of the stated goals of several decentralization laws, their enforcement in both regions has not promoted meaningful inclusion of local ordinary people in local political processes beyond electoral participation. In fact, it has been the weakest point of decentralization practices in both regions. Overall, the two case studies share a similar theme, namely that power remains actually concentrated in the hands of local elites and hence, local communities are constantly marginalized. Against this backdrop, in this chapter, I will examine a number of factors which have circumscribed the democr atic potential of the decentralization program in Indonesia. Based on the experiences of a variety of countries, some theorists suggest that successful decentralization policies are contingent upon certain individual or collective prerequisites. These include: a high degree of central state capacity, a well developed civil society, strong political will among national as well as local political elites, strong social support, a long experience of democracy, a well-established multi-party system, strong enabling legal frameworks, and a culture of accountability, etc (Rondinelli, McCullough Johnson 1989: 77-78; Crook Manor 1995: 327; Ardaya Thevoz 2001: 220; Heller 2001: 138-139). Regarding this assertion, analysts also emphasize that the extent to which these conditions work varies across countries. This means that some conditions work relatively well in certain countries, but in others they do not effectively facilitate the stated goals of decentralization policies (Kulipossa 2004: 771). In addition, Smoke (2003: 12) and Kulipossa (2004: 772 ) also draw attention to the fact that there are cases where decentralization can achieve its potential benefits in the absence of those conditions, as well as cases where most of those prerequisites are in place, but decentralization has been undermined. Against the above line of thought, I would argue here that to a certain extent, the unfulfilled democratic potential of decentralization practices in Bandung and Cirebon can also be associated with the absence of some of the above favourable conditions. These include weak political will among both national and local political authorities, the absence of a vibrant civil society, and the lack of an attentive public. Needless to say, these factors vary across time and regimes. Above all, the absence of these favourable conditions for fulfilling the democratic potential of decentralization appears to result from three aspects: first, all along, decentralization in Indonesia has been perceived and embraced by Indonesian political elites mainly as a matter of political strategy; second, the long-standing authoritarian system of government; and third, the primacy of pragmatic over political decentralization approach, both normatively and empirically. Decentralization in Indonesia: a matter of regimes political strategy? Among the most important factors which determines the design and the actual practices of decentralization and in turn, its expected consequences (e.g., improving public service delivery, maintaining national integration and promoting local democracy) is the motivation of key actors in adopting the policy in the first place (Selee Tulchin 2004). The experiences of many developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, for instance, attest that the motives of politicians that embrace decentralization policies are not necessarily as virtuous as those who design them. In fact, Smoke and Gomez (2006 : 351; see also, for example, Eaton 2001a; Shah Thompson 2004: 3-4) observe that despite the efficiency and good governance rhetoric surrounding decentralization, the underlying impetus has been inherently political, meaning that the adoption of decentralization has been linked to central governments desire to accomplish their own particular political interests. The factors underlying political interest are country and regime specific. They include, for instance, shoring up their legitimacy in the eyes of citizens usually amidst national political crisis, competition with rival political parties for popular support, pressure from subnational governments for more powers, and opportunity for a ruling party to consolidate power (Selee Tulchin 2004: 299-302; Smoke Gomez 2006 : 351). Many observers believe that these kinds of political motives have partly accounted for the failure of decentralization practices in many developing countries to deliver its democratic potential (Eaton 2001a; Friedman Kihato 2004; Oxhorn 2004). Indonesias decentralization experience is not an exception to the above phenomenon. Although promoting democratization has been one of the stated goals of Indonesias decentralization programs, there has been significant gap between rhetoric and reality. The continuous marginalization of local people from local political processes has been partly rooted in the ‘undemocratic political motives of both national and local political elites in adopting and implementing decentralization policy. As explained in Chapter Three, decentralization in Indonesia has never been constructed in a political vacuum. Hence, I would argue that the degree, pattern and process of decentralization has been strongly influenced by, borrowing Montero and Samuels term (2004: 5), political determinants, i.e., regime responses to changing conditions and incentives within the context of rapid political and economic changes. During the revolution era, decentralization policies recognized the principle of extensive autonomy in all regions of the newly independent Republic. However, such policies were actually constructed by national political elites as a means of establishing and maintaining national authority over many already operating local governments in those regions previously occupied by the colonial government. The polices were also constructed to fulfill other political ends, namely to gain international recognition, as contained in both Law No. 1 of 1945 and No. 22 of 1948 in the face of Dutch accusations that Indonesia was a puppet state of the Japanese. Thus, despite official claims that decentralization was embraced as an indispensable strategy in materializing a democratic system due to the countrys size and diverse characteristics, the embrace of the policy during this period was not genuinely related to the intention of developing meaningful democratic system within the country since those two basic laws were not followed by any clear operational directions whatsoever on how a democratic system of government would be crafted on the ground. This claim is underscored by the fact that there was no significant alteration in terms of local political processes in Bandung, Cirebon or other regions in the country. As Maryanov (1958: 9) also observed, Many of the institutions and practices adopted or utilized by independent Indonesia have been reflections of those established by the Netherlands East Indies†¦alterations in governmental structure turned out to be minor†¦patterns of administrative behavior remained rooted in the Dutch traditional procedures. Accordingly, the experiences of both Bandung and Cirebon during post-independence until mid 1950s revealed that, except for the establishment of local government structures, the enforcement of Law No. 1 of 1945 and No. 22 of 1948 allowed neither effective decentralization nor democratization in the regions. Needless to say, the political situation during revolutionary era also contributed to the limited enforcement of the policies in the regions. By the same token, there were three decisive political factors which led national political elites to adopt advanced decentralization policy as contained in Law No. 1 of 1957 which â€Å"greatly increased the power of elected legislative councils in the provinces, regencies, and municipalities† and set for wider regional authority vis-à  -vis the central government (Feith 1962: 552). These factors were, first, a kind of political promise by the government of Republic of Indonesia to the former constituent states of the Republic of the United States of Indonesiaà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢a federal structure created by the Dutchà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢ when they voluntarily decided to join the Republic of Indonesia to establish the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Second, the electoral calculations of various political parties in the Constituent Assembly to have wider mass bases in the regions and to play more influential roles in regional politics. And third, forestalling regional rebellions rooted in growing regional dissatisfaction concerning the central governments unfulfilled promises to carry out development. This was intertwined with other issues such as ethnic tension, economic imbalance and political rivalry between politicians in Java and the Outer Islands. Accordingly, most of the advanced provisions within Law No. 1 were considered to be immediate responses to the above political factors, such as the recognition of the principle of extensive autonomy which was applied based on the capacity of respective local governments and the election of heads of regions by the DPRDs. In addition, the direct election of members of the DPRD and the issuance of Indonesias first Fiscal Balance Law within the same year were also seen as inseparable efforts by national political elites to respond to those political factors. In turn, however, similar to its predecessors, such pragmatic and short term political calculations by national political elites prevented decentralization achieving its idealized outcomes. As Bandung and Cirebons experiences attest, until late 1950s, there was relatively little effective power actually decentralized. In addition, one might conclude that with the introduction of direct election of DPRD members and the election of head of region by the DPRD, local democracy was being crafted on the ground. However, it was not accompanied by channels of popular participation beyond the election. Recapping the above political motives in adopting such advances provisions in Law No. 1, neither central government policy makers nor democratically elected local governments in either case study considered this issue as among their political goals. Accordingly, the two case studies demonstrate that the dynamic of political parties and decentralization practices in Bandung and Cirebon clearly d id not make local political process more open to participation by local people. Decentralization practices during the Sukarno and Suharto eras obviously confirm the argument that decentralization can be applied within authoritarian regime (Eaton 2001a: 3; Montero Samuels 2004: 10). These cases, however, it was by no means aimed at achieving the various virtues routinely discussed by democratization theorists, but rather at tightening their control over the apparatus of local government at all levels in order to facilitate an authoritarian system. This was particularly fulfilled by making both subnational executives and legislatures appointed and hence, accountable to the national authorities. Thus, these local apparatus were nothing but the instruments of central government with their main function representing the central governments interests in the regions. Yet again, such decentralization was not made in a political vacuum. Prior to the enforcement of Presidential Edict No. 6 of 1959 concerning Regional Government and Presidential Edict No. 5 of 1960 regarding the Gotong Royong Regional Representative Council and Regional Secretariat (Sekretaris Daerah), Indonesia was hit by escalating political turbulence due to the outbreak of rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi, the repeated collapse of governing coalitions at the national level in addition to the failure of the Constituent Assembly to make a replacement for the Provisional 1950 Constitution. In turn, these aspects triggered the issuance of a wave of government regulations by Sukarno intended to overhaul the system of government based on his personal concept of Guided Democracyà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Ã¢â‚¬ a democracy with a leadership†(van der Kroef 1957: 115). This concept was believed to be an alternative to troublesome â€Å"Western concepts of parliamentary democracy† wh ich had supposedly led to the above political turbulence due to the weakness of government authority and the vehemence of political opposition (van der Kroef 1957: 113). Thus, the new arrangements in local governance were specifically aimed at facilitating Sukarnos own concept of Guided Democracy, which required a total subservience of local governments to central government policies. Sukarno himself was closely involved in setting in place local government institutions, such as heads of regions and local councils. Suharto did not loosen up central control when he took over from Sukarno following the abortive conspiracy by left-wing officers in 1965 until his demise in 1998 (Malley 1999: 75). In fact, severe economic and political crisis inherited from the previous regime contributed to the deepening of authoritarianism that fostered a highly centralized system of government. Suhartos regime believed that this mode of government could retain political and economic stability as its ultimate basis for overcoming the crisis. Another important determinant of Suhartos centralistic policy towards local government system was the need to establish and consolidate an effective government administration over the vast and diverse country (MacAndrews 1986: 27-30). In turn, these variables contributed to the centralistic nature of New Orders ‘decentralization law ¾Law No. 5 of 1974 concerning The Basic Principle of Government in the Regional Government through which â€Å"the regions had neither in fluence over national government policies nor the power to control their own affairs† (Aspinall Fealy 2003: 2). In essence, throughout Suhartos regime, local governments were mainly as implementers of various policies constructed and financially supported by the central government. Thus, both the Sukarno and Suharto regime indeed continued to adopt ‘decentralization policies as represented by the existence of the above law and regulations. However, all were intended to facilitate central government control and greater penetration of society in order to repress vehemence political opposition so that all central government policies and interests would be efficiently implemented down to the lowest level of governments without any resistance. Needless to say, such a mode of ‘decentralization provided no space for citizen participation. Many Indonesians had great hopes that the so-called ‘Big Bang approach to decentralization launched in 2001 would at last bring into reality the various potential benefits of the policy, including democratic local governance. However, various studies (e.g., Anggraini 2007; The Asia Foundation, 2002a; The Asia Foundation, 2002b; Wardana 2007) including two case studies discussed in previous chapters confirm that the decentralization practices have gone without meaningful opening up institutional spaces for greater citizen participation, even though, promoting local democratic governance was among the stated goals of the ‘Big Bang approach. Yet again, a key problem was that realizing democratic potential was not among the main goals of the national political elites when they adopted the policy. Rather, as explained in Chapter Three, the ‘Big Bang policy was motivated by a number of crucial political determinants that had little to do with developing local democracy or even with the neo-liberal agenda of achieving a more effective and efficient public service. These included forestalling national disintegration amidst the emergence of separatist movements and the vocal demands for more autonomy from some resource-rich regions (Sukma 2003: 65; Hidayat Antlov 2004: 271; Hofman Kaiser 2004: 17) ; restoring the legitimacy of the state as well as national elites following the collapse of Suhartos regime, severe economic crisis, and the loss of East Timor (Smoke Gomez 2006 : 353); transferring financial burdens from the center to the regions amidst dramatic decline of central governments financial capacity following t he economic crisis of 1997-1999 (Hidayat Antlov 2004: 271-272); and, no less important, electoral calculus of Habibies to garner the support of the regions prior to the presidential elections (Hofman Kaiser 2004: 17). It was for these strategic reasons, few of which were related to democracy, that the government was willing to embrace a radical approach to decentralization. Further consequence, as attested in Bandung District and City of Cirebon cases, neither clear and firm central governments policies or programs, nor local governance meaningfully accommodated the rhetoric of promoting democratization into reality. Although it was often argued that local democracy was strengthened through the significant empowerment of DPRD vis-à  -vis head of region (Rasyid 2003), this mechanism of political representation in fact could not deliver effective accomplishment of what Fung and Wright (2003: 3) called, the central ideas of democratic politics: facilitating active political involvement of the citizenry, forging political consensus through dialogue, devising and implementing public policies that ground a productive economy and healthy society, and, in more radical egalitarian versions of the democratic ideal, assuring that all citizens benefit from the nations wealth. The enforcement of Indonesias latest decentralization lawà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Law No. 32 of 2004à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢did not make local political processes more inclusive either, since the law was not motivated by the intention to so. On the surface, it might appear that the formulation of the law was driven by the intention of the Megawati administration to curb the emergence of various abuses of Law No. 22 of 1999, such as rampant corruption and blatant money politics, ethnic parochialism, and the proliferation of excessive taxes which had led to a high cost economy to name some of the most worrying signs. Many perceived that all of these problems were rooted in imperfect laws and the lack of a clearly designed plan (Turner et al. 2003; Legowo 2003; Legowo Djadijono n.d). More compelling is the argument that the attempt was a straightforward act of re-centralization. Such an act is particularly rooted in the nature of decentralization itself, which is not merely as an administrative business, but rather it involves the distributional struggles between national and subnational elites regarding control over local resources (Slater Watson 1989: 511; Montero 2001: 44-45; Hadiz 2003b: 123). Accordingly, meaningful decentralization always faces enormous political obstacles and can be subjected to serious setbacks. One of the salient challenges is the preference of national elites to slow down the process of decentralization and to reinforce their attempts to control it. As Eaton (2001b: 102) suggests, â€Å"national politicians can and do continue to use their legislative authority to modify the initial decision to decentralize†. Thus, for national politicians, â€Å"decentralization is neither inevitable nor irreversible† (Eaton 2001b: 101). I would suggest that the enforcement of the latest Indonesias decentralization lawà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Law No. 32 of 2004à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢perfectly supports this line of argument. This contention is further strengthened by the fact that Law No. 32 restores and strengthens the province and the Ministry of Home Affairs positions in regional affairs at the expense of district governments authority (Eko 2005: 27-29; Ryaas Rashid as cited in Myala 2005). The only new provision within Law No. 32 of 2004 embraced by many as a significant leap in decentralization and local democratization efforts regarded the direct election of heads of regions However, as Fung and Wright argues (2003: 3), the election of both legislative and executive offices are not sufficient to accommodate the influence of local ordinary people on local political processes beyond the election. As the experiences of Bandung and Cirebon attest, there has not been any significant alteration in terms of developing inclusive local political process in the aftermath of the head of region elections. It must be admitted that the promulgation of Local Regulation on Transparency and Participation in Bandung District in 2004 was actually a progressive step in institutionalizing active political involvement of local people. However, it has not been effectively implemented yet. Lack of political will on the part of local to consistently implement the regulation has ensured that it has had only rhetorical value. The claim that popular participation has been channeled through the annual development planning process is specious, since the process is actually still strongly dominated by local government officers. New arrangements in local governance based on Law No. 32 have in fact significantly reduced the power of DPRDs vis-à  -vis heads of regions, since the former no longer have the power to elect and to hold the latter accountable, as regulated in the previous decentralization law. The head of region is now accountable to the central authorities with the president at the apex of the hierarchy. Thus, from a representative democracy point of view, there has been a significant retreat as well. Thus, the lesson seems to be that decentralization in Indonesia has been pursued mainly as a political strategy to fulfill certain political ends, particularly those of national elites within the context of political and economic crisis. Deepening democracy has never been the driving force behind decentralization reform. It is therefore no surprise that we find a lack of political will to realize the democratic potential of decentralization policies at any stage of Indonesias history. Smoke (2003: 12) points out that among the most ubiquitous claims regarding impediments to decentralizations success is the lack of strong political will from various stakeholders involved in the process. Theorists do not all mean the same thing when they talk about ‘political will. For some theorists, strong political will can be seen from the existence of constitutional or legal instruments made by political elites, both national and local (Rondinelli, McCullough Johnson 1989: 77-78; Smoke 2003 : 12). Nevertheless, since many cases also show that decentralization policies cannot attain their intended goals,[2] theorists also emphasize that constitutional and legal instruments are not sufficient to ensure workable decentralization policies. As Isaac (2001: 9) firmly argues, Fundamental reforms cannot be merely legislated. Legislation remains empty phrases unless powerful movements oversee their implementation. Legislation is necessary but not sufficient for decentralization. Accordingly, as Rondinelli (1983: 198-200) highlights, political will must also be measured from the actual realization of those normative arrangements particularly by central political authorities transferring planning, decision-making and managerial authority to lower levels of governments, and also by local political authorities sharing their authority with local citizens through opening up effective channels for political participation so that local citizens, especially the poor and marginalized ones, are able to express their needs and demands and to press claims or national and local development resources. Thus, this dimension of political will is also essential, since in many cases, normative arrangements of decentralization are often used to facilitate political aims that have little to do with devolving power to lower level of governments and utilizing this power to effectively fulfill local peoples needs and demands. As Crook (2003: 85-86) stresses, in some African countrie s the real goal is often to consolidate power through political parties and local elites, or to deliberately neutralize local ethnic challenges through fragmenting â€Å"potential local power bases into smaller, weaker, politically insignificant units†. Based on the above line of thought, the lack of political will in pursuing the democratic potential of Indonesias decentralization can be viewed from different perspectives. Normatively, even though the embrace of the policy may initially be claimed to be an indispensable strategy to develop a democratic system of government, its subsequent adoption within constitutions and some existing decentralization laws as well as their operational regulations in the regions so far has never been clear, firm, and consistent. Neither constitutions nor basic legislation and its subsequent operational regulations explicitly note that promoting local democracy is among the intended goals of decentralization programs. During the New Order era, Development Planning (Perencanaan Pembangunan), which was regulated within the Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation of 1982 (Permendagri No. 9/1982), was claimed to be adopting a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches. Empirically, however, as proven in the experiences of Bandung District and City of Cirebon, the planning process was actually highly centralized and practically excluded public participation. The local governments development planning processes were nothing but breaking down the centrally planned parameters. One might find that this was not the case during the post-Suharto era, particularly with regard to Law No.22 of 1999 and Law No. 32 of 2004. Indeed, some argue that Law No. 22 in particular, was intended to promote local democracy and participation, as evident in its preamble: â€Å"in the implementation of Regional Autonomy is deemed to be necessary to emphasize more the principles of democracy, public participation, equal distribution and fairness, and considering the potential and regional diversity† (Turner et al. 2003: 23; see also, Jaya Dick 2001: 216). However, it appears that further details on how local democracy would be implemented on the ground were actually ill-defined. The national government in fact issued a separate regulation, i.e. Government Regulation No. 68 of 1999 regarding public participation in the governmental process.[3] From the title of the regulation, one might easily assume that it was regarding peoples involvement in the governments policy-making process. But, it was actually not. The regulation was actually more about peoples rights rather than facilitating popular participation. Four rights were mentioned: the right to obtain and give information regarding governmental process; the right to get fair service from the government; the right to give advice to the government policies; and the right to legal protection (perlindungan hukum).[4] Thus, the Government Regulation did not specifically mention that popular participation would be the essential component of the government policy-making process. In addition, knowing that popular participation was framed in terms of rights, it means that it was set on voluntary basis. I believe t hat such setting provided weak encouragement for the public to be engaged in governmental process. In the case of Law No. 32, its prologue reads, †¦local government, which manages and oversees its own governmental affairs based on the principles of decentralization and medebewind (co-operating administration) , is directed towards boosting people welfare through service improvement, empowerment, and popular participation, as well as improving regional competitiveness by taking into account the principles of democracy, equal distribution, fairness, specialness (keistimewaan), and specific characteristics (kekhususan) of a region within the system of Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia. From the above prologue, there would appear to be no significant difference between Law No. 22 and Law No. 32. However, one might argue that central government, as the main architect of the law, showed stronger political will to uphold local democracy in Law No. 32 rather than its predecessor, based on two novel articles within the law, i.e. Article 56 (1) regarding the direct election of head and deputy head of local government and Article 139 (1) which stated that â€Å"Local community has the right to provide input verbally or in writing for the preparation of or during the deliberation of a proposed bill.† Direct election of head and deputy head of local government is undeniably desirable since, as Peterson (1997: 14) argues, indirect elections have â€Å"tended to perpetuate the strength of political insiders, who are often more accountable to their party hierarchy than to the public at large†. Nevertheless, further analysis of other articles reveals that direct el ection of head and deputy head of local government actually lacked democratic orientation in three aspects: first, the election process was practically dominated by political parties maneuvers, especially during the selection of the candidates for head and deputy head of local government, which is prone to power abuse by ‘selling the office to the highest bidder; second, there was strong intervention from national political party boards in determining the candidates; and third, the election gave no opportunity for independent candidates (Legowo Djadijono n.d). Hence, in the end, local communities have become the last component in the whole series of the election process. In other words, the novel provisions regarding the direct election of head and deputy head of local government only left the local community marginalized. More importantly, direct election is insufficient for developing strong local democracy since â€Å"elections occur infrequently and allow for only limited citizen input or feedback regarding specific local concerns or policy options† (Posner 2004: 57). Strong local democracy, Posner argues, needs to be backed up by active political participation of local constituencies beyond the mere act of voting. With regard to Article 139 (1), it appears that popular participation was provided for on a voluntarily basis. What I am pointing out here is that the article indicates that popular participation in local policy making process was not an essential factor in the process. This point is underlined by the fact that there were no other provisions within Law No. 32 which obligated local government institutions to engage the local community meaningfully in the process. Decentralization and Democratization in Indonesia Decentralization and Democratization in Indonesia Chapter Six Lessons and Implications The changes in Indonesia have been incrementalWe still have the New Order, or most of it. Anyway, the corrosive parts are still reigning in. We have a new administration but the New Order keeps coming back in various ways. Dwight T. King[1] It is a paradox that, in an era when democracy seems to have emerged as the single most acceptable form of political organization, more and more people in both mature and young democracies are disengaging from the political process. Knight, Chigudu Tandon (2002) †¦a breakdown of an authoritarian regime may be reversed†¦even if democracy is established, it need not be consolidated. Under certain conditions, democratic institutions may systematically generate outcomes that cause some politically important forces to opt for authoritarianism. Hence, consolidated democracy is only one among the possible outcomes of breakdown of authoritarian regimes. Pzeworski (1991: 51) Introduction The discussion in previous chapters provides a foundation for important theoretical insights regarding the nature and the significance of decentralization in Indonesia, as well as its relation to democratization in the regions. I have emphasized how decentralization practices in the regions promote popular participation in local political processes beyond electoral participation. By and large, the experiences of Bandung District and City of Cirebon in implementing decentralization between 1945 and 2006 lend support to the argument that decentralization does not necessarily lead to the growth of local democracy within which local ordinary people are able to exert their power to significantly influence local decision-making process. Although promoting democracy has become one of the stated goals of several decentralization laws, their enforcement in both regions has not promoted meaningful inclusion of local ordinary people in local political processes beyond electoral participation. In fact, it has been the weakest point of decentralization practices in both regions. Overall, the two case studies share a similar theme, namely that power remains actually concentrated in the hands of local elites and hence, local communities are constantly marginalized. Against this backdrop, in this chapter, I will examine a number of factors which have circumscribed the democr atic potential of the decentralization program in Indonesia. Based on the experiences of a variety of countries, some theorists suggest that successful decentralization policies are contingent upon certain individual or collective prerequisites. These include: a high degree of central state capacity, a well developed civil society, strong political will among national as well as local political elites, strong social support, a long experience of democracy, a well-established multi-party system, strong enabling legal frameworks, and a culture of accountability, etc (Rondinelli, McCullough Johnson 1989: 77-78; Crook Manor 1995: 327; Ardaya Thevoz 2001: 220; Heller 2001: 138-139). Regarding this assertion, analysts also emphasize that the extent to which these conditions work varies across countries. This means that some conditions work relatively well in certain countries, but in others they do not effectively facilitate the stated goals of decentralization policies (Kulipossa 2004: 771). In addition, Smoke (2003: 12) and Kulipossa (2004: 772 ) also draw attention to the fact that there are cases where decentralization can achieve its potential benefits in the absence of those conditions, as well as cases where most of those prerequisites are in place, but decentralization has been undermined. Against the above line of thought, I would argue here that to a certain extent, the unfulfilled democratic potential of decentralization practices in Bandung and Cirebon can also be associated with the absence of some of the above favourable conditions. These include weak political will among both national and local political authorities, the absence of a vibrant civil society, and the lack of an attentive public. Needless to say, these factors vary across time and regimes. Above all, the absence of these favourable conditions for fulfilling the democratic potential of decentralization appears to result from three aspects: first, all along, decentralization in Indonesia has been perceived and embraced by Indonesian political elites mainly as a matter of political strategy; second, the long-standing authoritarian system of government; and third, the primacy of pragmatic over political decentralization approach, both normatively and empirically. Decentralization in Indonesia: a matter of regimes political strategy? Among the most important factors which determines the design and the actual practices of decentralization and in turn, its expected consequences (e.g., improving public service delivery, maintaining national integration and promoting local democracy) is the motivation of key actors in adopting the policy in the first place (Selee Tulchin 2004). The experiences of many developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, for instance, attest that the motives of politicians that embrace decentralization policies are not necessarily as virtuous as those who design them. In fact, Smoke and Gomez (2006 : 351; see also, for example, Eaton 2001a; Shah Thompson 2004: 3-4) observe that despite the efficiency and good governance rhetoric surrounding decentralization, the underlying impetus has been inherently political, meaning that the adoption of decentralization has been linked to central governments desire to accomplish their own particular political interests. The factors underlying political interest are country and regime specific. They include, for instance, shoring up their legitimacy in the eyes of citizens usually amidst national political crisis, competition with rival political parties for popular support, pressure from subnational governments for more powers, and opportunity for a ruling party to consolidate power (Selee Tulchin 2004: 299-302; Smoke Gomez 2006 : 351). Many observers believe that these kinds of political motives have partly accounted for the failure of decentralization practices in many developing countries to deliver its democratic potential (Eaton 2001a; Friedman Kihato 2004; Oxhorn 2004). Indonesias decentralization experience is not an exception to the above phenomenon. Although promoting democratization has been one of the stated goals of Indonesias decentralization programs, there has been significant gap between rhetoric and reality. The continuous marginalization of local people from local political processes has been partly rooted in the ‘undemocratic political motives of both national and local political elites in adopting and implementing decentralization policy. As explained in Chapter Three, decentralization in Indonesia has never been constructed in a political vacuum. Hence, I would argue that the degree, pattern and process of decentralization has been strongly influenced by, borrowing Montero and Samuels term (2004: 5), political determinants, i.e., regime responses to changing conditions and incentives within the context of rapid political and economic changes. During the revolution era, decentralization policies recognized the principle of extensive autonomy in all regions of the newly independent Republic. However, such policies were actually constructed by national political elites as a means of establishing and maintaining national authority over many already operating local governments in those regions previously occupied by the colonial government. The polices were also constructed to fulfill other political ends, namely to gain international recognition, as contained in both Law No. 1 of 1945 and No. 22 of 1948 in the face of Dutch accusations that Indonesia was a puppet state of the Japanese. Thus, despite official claims that decentralization was embraced as an indispensable strategy in materializing a democratic system due to the countrys size and diverse characteristics, the embrace of the policy during this period was not genuinely related to the intention of developing meaningful democratic system within the country since those two basic laws were not followed by any clear operational directions whatsoever on how a democratic system of government would be crafted on the ground. This claim is underscored by the fact that there was no significant alteration in terms of local political processes in Bandung, Cirebon or other regions in the country. As Maryanov (1958: 9) also observed, Many of the institutions and practices adopted or utilized by independent Indonesia have been reflections of those established by the Netherlands East Indies†¦alterations in governmental structure turned out to be minor†¦patterns of administrative behavior remained rooted in the Dutch traditional procedures. Accordingly, the experiences of both Bandung and Cirebon during post-independence until mid 1950s revealed that, except for the establishment of local government structures, the enforcement of Law No. 1 of 1945 and No. 22 of 1948 allowed neither effective decentralization nor democratization in the regions. Needless to say, the political situation during revolutionary era also contributed to the limited enforcement of the policies in the regions. By the same token, there were three decisive political factors which led national political elites to adopt advanced decentralization policy as contained in Law No. 1 of 1957 which â€Å"greatly increased the power of elected legislative councils in the provinces, regencies, and municipalities† and set for wider regional authority vis-à  -vis the central government (Feith 1962: 552). These factors were, first, a kind of political promise by the government of Republic of Indonesia to the former constituent states of the Republic of the United States of Indonesiaà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢a federal structure created by the Dutchà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢ when they voluntarily decided to join the Republic of Indonesia to establish the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Second, the electoral calculations of various political parties in the Constituent Assembly to have wider mass bases in the regions and to play more influential roles in regional politics. And third, forestalling regional rebellions rooted in growing regional dissatisfaction concerning the central governments unfulfilled promises to carry out development. This was intertwined with other issues such as ethnic tension, economic imbalance and political rivalry between politicians in Java and the Outer Islands. Accordingly, most of the advanced provisions within Law No. 1 were considered to be immediate responses to the above political factors, such as the recognition of the principle of extensive autonomy which was applied based on the capacity of respective local governments and the election of heads of regions by the DPRDs. In addition, the direct election of members of the DPRD and the issuance of Indonesias first Fiscal Balance Law within the same year were also seen as inseparable efforts by national political elites to respond to those political factors. In turn, however, similar to its predecessors, such pragmatic and short term political calculations by national political elites prevented decentralization achieving its idealized outcomes. As Bandung and Cirebons experiences attest, until late 1950s, there was relatively little effective power actually decentralized. In addition, one might conclude that with the introduction of direct election of DPRD members and the election of head of region by the DPRD, local democracy was being crafted on the ground. However, it was not accompanied by channels of popular participation beyond the election. Recapping the above political motives in adopting such advances provisions in Law No. 1, neither central government policy makers nor democratically elected local governments in either case study considered this issue as among their political goals. Accordingly, the two case studies demonstrate that the dynamic of political parties and decentralization practices in Bandung and Cirebon clearly d id not make local political process more open to participation by local people. Decentralization practices during the Sukarno and Suharto eras obviously confirm the argument that decentralization can be applied within authoritarian regime (Eaton 2001a: 3; Montero Samuels 2004: 10). These cases, however, it was by no means aimed at achieving the various virtues routinely discussed by democratization theorists, but rather at tightening their control over the apparatus of local government at all levels in order to facilitate an authoritarian system. This was particularly fulfilled by making both subnational executives and legislatures appointed and hence, accountable to the national authorities. Thus, these local apparatus were nothing but the instruments of central government with their main function representing the central governments interests in the regions. Yet again, such decentralization was not made in a political vacuum. Prior to the enforcement of Presidential Edict No. 6 of 1959 concerning Regional Government and Presidential Edict No. 5 of 1960 regarding the Gotong Royong Regional Representative Council and Regional Secretariat (Sekretaris Daerah), Indonesia was hit by escalating political turbulence due to the outbreak of rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi, the repeated collapse of governing coalitions at the national level in addition to the failure of the Constituent Assembly to make a replacement for the Provisional 1950 Constitution. In turn, these aspects triggered the issuance of a wave of government regulations by Sukarno intended to overhaul the system of government based on his personal concept of Guided Democracyà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Ã¢â‚¬ a democracy with a leadership†(van der Kroef 1957: 115). This concept was believed to be an alternative to troublesome â€Å"Western concepts of parliamentary democracy† wh ich had supposedly led to the above political turbulence due to the weakness of government authority and the vehemence of political opposition (van der Kroef 1957: 113). Thus, the new arrangements in local governance were specifically aimed at facilitating Sukarnos own concept of Guided Democracy, which required a total subservience of local governments to central government policies. Sukarno himself was closely involved in setting in place local government institutions, such as heads of regions and local councils. Suharto did not loosen up central control when he took over from Sukarno following the abortive conspiracy by left-wing officers in 1965 until his demise in 1998 (Malley 1999: 75). In fact, severe economic and political crisis inherited from the previous regime contributed to the deepening of authoritarianism that fostered a highly centralized system of government. Suhartos regime believed that this mode of government could retain political and economic stability as its ultimate basis for overcoming the crisis. Another important determinant of Suhartos centralistic policy towards local government system was the need to establish and consolidate an effective government administration over the vast and diverse country (MacAndrews 1986: 27-30). In turn, these variables contributed to the centralistic nature of New Orders ‘decentralization law ¾Law No. 5 of 1974 concerning The Basic Principle of Government in the Regional Government through which â€Å"the regions had neither in fluence over national government policies nor the power to control their own affairs† (Aspinall Fealy 2003: 2). In essence, throughout Suhartos regime, local governments were mainly as implementers of various policies constructed and financially supported by the central government. Thus, both the Sukarno and Suharto regime indeed continued to adopt ‘decentralization policies as represented by the existence of the above law and regulations. However, all were intended to facilitate central government control and greater penetration of society in order to repress vehemence political opposition so that all central government policies and interests would be efficiently implemented down to the lowest level of governments without any resistance. Needless to say, such a mode of ‘decentralization provided no space for citizen participation. Many Indonesians had great hopes that the so-called ‘Big Bang approach to decentralization launched in 2001 would at last bring into reality the various potential benefits of the policy, including democratic local governance. However, various studies (e.g., Anggraini 2007; The Asia Foundation, 2002a; The Asia Foundation, 2002b; Wardana 2007) including two case studies discussed in previous chapters confirm that the decentralization practices have gone without meaningful opening up institutional spaces for greater citizen participation, even though, promoting local democratic governance was among the stated goals of the ‘Big Bang approach. Yet again, a key problem was that realizing democratic potential was not among the main goals of the national political elites when they adopted the policy. Rather, as explained in Chapter Three, the ‘Big Bang policy was motivated by a number of crucial political determinants that had little to do with developing local democracy or even with the neo-liberal agenda of achieving a more effective and efficient public service. These included forestalling national disintegration amidst the emergence of separatist movements and the vocal demands for more autonomy from some resource-rich regions (Sukma 2003: 65; Hidayat Antlov 2004: 271; Hofman Kaiser 2004: 17) ; restoring the legitimacy of the state as well as national elites following the collapse of Suhartos regime, severe economic crisis, and the loss of East Timor (Smoke Gomez 2006 : 353); transferring financial burdens from the center to the regions amidst dramatic decline of central governments financial capacity following t he economic crisis of 1997-1999 (Hidayat Antlov 2004: 271-272); and, no less important, electoral calculus of Habibies to garner the support of the regions prior to the presidential elections (Hofman Kaiser 2004: 17). It was for these strategic reasons, few of which were related to democracy, that the government was willing to embrace a radical approach to decentralization. Further consequence, as attested in Bandung District and City of Cirebon cases, neither clear and firm central governments policies or programs, nor local governance meaningfully accommodated the rhetoric of promoting democratization into reality. Although it was often argued that local democracy was strengthened through the significant empowerment of DPRD vis-à  -vis head of region (Rasyid 2003), this mechanism of political representation in fact could not deliver effective accomplishment of what Fung and Wright (2003: 3) called, the central ideas of democratic politics: facilitating active political involvement of the citizenry, forging political consensus through dialogue, devising and implementing public policies that ground a productive economy and healthy society, and, in more radical egalitarian versions of the democratic ideal, assuring that all citizens benefit from the nations wealth. The enforcement of Indonesias latest decentralization lawà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Law No. 32 of 2004à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢did not make local political processes more inclusive either, since the law was not motivated by the intention to so. On the surface, it might appear that the formulation of the law was driven by the intention of the Megawati administration to curb the emergence of various abuses of Law No. 22 of 1999, such as rampant corruption and blatant money politics, ethnic parochialism, and the proliferation of excessive taxes which had led to a high cost economy to name some of the most worrying signs. Many perceived that all of these problems were rooted in imperfect laws and the lack of a clearly designed plan (Turner et al. 2003; Legowo 2003; Legowo Djadijono n.d). More compelling is the argument that the attempt was a straightforward act of re-centralization. Such an act is particularly rooted in the nature of decentralization itself, which is not merely as an administrative business, but rather it involves the distributional struggles between national and subnational elites regarding control over local resources (Slater Watson 1989: 511; Montero 2001: 44-45; Hadiz 2003b: 123). Accordingly, meaningful decentralization always faces enormous political obstacles and can be subjected to serious setbacks. One of the salient challenges is the preference of national elites to slow down the process of decentralization and to reinforce their attempts to control it. As Eaton (2001b: 102) suggests, â€Å"national politicians can and do continue to use their legislative authority to modify the initial decision to decentralize†. Thus, for national politicians, â€Å"decentralization is neither inevitable nor irreversible† (Eaton 2001b: 101). I would suggest that the enforcement of the latest Indonesias decentralization lawà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Law No. 32 of 2004à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢perfectly supports this line of argument. This contention is further strengthened by the fact that Law No. 32 restores and strengthens the province and the Ministry of Home Affairs positions in regional affairs at the expense of district governments authority (Eko 2005: 27-29; Ryaas Rashid as cited in Myala 2005). The only new provision within Law No. 32 of 2004 embraced by many as a significant leap in decentralization and local democratization efforts regarded the direct election of heads of regions However, as Fung and Wright argues (2003: 3), the election of both legislative and executive offices are not sufficient to accommodate the influence of local ordinary people on local political processes beyond the election. As the experiences of Bandung and Cirebon attest, there has not been any significant alteration in terms of developing inclusive local political process in the aftermath of the head of region elections. It must be admitted that the promulgation of Local Regulation on Transparency and Participation in Bandung District in 2004 was actually a progressive step in institutionalizing active political involvement of local people. However, it has not been effectively implemented yet. Lack of political will on the part of local to consistently implement the regulation has ensured that it has had only rhetorical value. The claim that popular participation has been channeled through the annual development planning process is specious, since the process is actually still strongly dominated by local government officers. New arrangements in local governance based on Law No. 32 have in fact significantly reduced the power of DPRDs vis-à  -vis heads of regions, since the former no longer have the power to elect and to hold the latter accountable, as regulated in the previous decentralization law. The head of region is now accountable to the central authorities with the president at the apex of the hierarchy. Thus, from a representative democracy point of view, there has been a significant retreat as well. Thus, the lesson seems to be that decentralization in Indonesia has been pursued mainly as a political strategy to fulfill certain political ends, particularly those of national elites within the context of political and economic crisis. Deepening democracy has never been the driving force behind decentralization reform. It is therefore no surprise that we find a lack of political will to realize the democratic potential of decentralization policies at any stage of Indonesias history. Smoke (2003: 12) points out that among the most ubiquitous claims regarding impediments to decentralizations success is the lack of strong political will from various stakeholders involved in the process. Theorists do not all mean the same thing when they talk about ‘political will. For some theorists, strong political will can be seen from the existence of constitutional or legal instruments made by political elites, both national and local (Rondinelli, McCullough Johnson 1989: 77-78; Smoke 2003 : 12). Nevertheless, since many cases also show that decentralization policies cannot attain their intended goals,[2] theorists also emphasize that constitutional and legal instruments are not sufficient to ensure workable decentralization policies. As Isaac (2001: 9) firmly argues, Fundamental reforms cannot be merely legislated. Legislation remains empty phrases unless powerful movements oversee their implementation. Legislation is necessary but not sufficient for decentralization. Accordingly, as Rondinelli (1983: 198-200) highlights, political will must also be measured from the actual realization of those normative arrangements particularly by central political authorities transferring planning, decision-making and managerial authority to lower levels of governments, and also by local political authorities sharing their authority with local citizens through opening up effective channels for political participation so that local citizens, especially the poor and marginalized ones, are able to express their needs and demands and to press claims or national and local development resources. Thus, this dimension of political will is also essential, since in many cases, normative arrangements of decentralization are often used to facilitate political aims that have little to do with devolving power to lower level of governments and utilizing this power to effectively fulfill local peoples needs and demands. As Crook (2003: 85-86) stresses, in some African countrie s the real goal is often to consolidate power through political parties and local elites, or to deliberately neutralize local ethnic challenges through fragmenting â€Å"potential local power bases into smaller, weaker, politically insignificant units†. Based on the above line of thought, the lack of political will in pursuing the democratic potential of Indonesias decentralization can be viewed from different perspectives. Normatively, even though the embrace of the policy may initially be claimed to be an indispensable strategy to develop a democratic system of government, its subsequent adoption within constitutions and some existing decentralization laws as well as their operational regulations in the regions so far has never been clear, firm, and consistent. Neither constitutions nor basic legislation and its subsequent operational regulations explicitly note that promoting local democracy is among the intended goals of decentralization programs. During the New Order era, Development Planning (Perencanaan Pembangunan), which was regulated within the Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation of 1982 (Permendagri No. 9/1982), was claimed to be adopting a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches. Empirically, however, as proven in the experiences of Bandung District and City of Cirebon, the planning process was actually highly centralized and practically excluded public participation. The local governments development planning processes were nothing but breaking down the centrally planned parameters. One might find that this was not the case during the post-Suharto era, particularly with regard to Law No.22 of 1999 and Law No. 32 of 2004. Indeed, some argue that Law No. 22 in particular, was intended to promote local democracy and participation, as evident in its preamble: â€Å"in the implementation of Regional Autonomy is deemed to be necessary to emphasize more the principles of democracy, public participation, equal distribution and fairness, and considering the potential and regional diversity† (Turner et al. 2003: 23; see also, Jaya Dick 2001: 216). However, it appears that further details on how local democracy would be implemented on the ground were actually ill-defined. The national government in fact issued a separate regulation, i.e. Government Regulation No. 68 of 1999 regarding public participation in the governmental process.[3] From the title of the regulation, one might easily assume that it was regarding peoples involvement in the governments policy-making process. But, it was actually not. The regulation was actually more about peoples rights rather than facilitating popular participation. Four rights were mentioned: the right to obtain and give information regarding governmental process; the right to get fair service from the government; the right to give advice to the government policies; and the right to legal protection (perlindungan hukum).[4] Thus, the Government Regulation did not specifically mention that popular participation would be the essential component of the government policy-making process. In addition, knowing that popular participation was framed in terms of rights, it means that it was set on voluntary basis. I believe t hat such setting provided weak encouragement for the public to be engaged in governmental process. In the case of Law No. 32, its prologue reads, †¦local government, which manages and oversees its own governmental affairs based on the principles of decentralization and medebewind (co-operating administration) , is directed towards boosting people welfare through service improvement, empowerment, and popular participation, as well as improving regional competitiveness by taking into account the principles of democracy, equal distribution, fairness, specialness (keistimewaan), and specific characteristics (kekhususan) of a region within the system of Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia. From the above prologue, there would appear to be no significant difference between Law No. 22 and Law No. 32. However, one might argue that central government, as the main architect of the law, showed stronger political will to uphold local democracy in Law No. 32 rather than its predecessor, based on two novel articles within the law, i.e. Article 56 (1) regarding the direct election of head and deputy head of local government and Article 139 (1) which stated that â€Å"Local community has the right to provide input verbally or in writing for the preparation of or during the deliberation of a proposed bill.† Direct election of head and deputy head of local government is undeniably desirable since, as Peterson (1997: 14) argues, indirect elections have â€Å"tended to perpetuate the strength of political insiders, who are often more accountable to their party hierarchy than to the public at large†. Nevertheless, further analysis of other articles reveals that direct el ection of head and deputy head of local government actually lacked democratic orientation in three aspects: first, the election process was practically dominated by political parties maneuvers, especially during the selection of the candidates for head and deputy head of local government, which is prone to power abuse by ‘selling the office to the highest bidder; second, there was strong intervention from national political party boards in determining the candidates; and third, the election gave no opportunity for independent candidates (Legowo Djadijono n.d). Hence, in the end, local communities have become the last component in the whole series of the election process. In other words, the novel provisions regarding the direct election of head and deputy head of local government only left the local community marginalized. More importantly, direct election is insufficient for developing strong local democracy since â€Å"elections occur infrequently and allow for only limited citizen input or feedback regarding specific local concerns or policy options† (Posner 2004: 57). Strong local democracy, Posner argues, needs to be backed up by active political participation of local constituencies beyond the mere act of voting. With regard to Article 139 (1), it appears that popular participation was provided for on a voluntarily basis. What I am pointing out here is that the article indicates that popular participation in local policy making process was not an essential factor in the process. This point is underlined by the fact that there were no other provisions within Law No. 32 which obligated local government institutions to engage the local community meaningfully in the process.