LA Phil Concert Mozarts Requiem at Hollywood Bowl by Los Angeles Philharmonic free essay sample

I would like to play Mozart’s Requiem at my wedding. (My mother said that she would approve of any person who would agree with this request.) Although the Requiem has a decidedly dark tone, the piece, written by Mozart on his deathbed, emanates with lively energy, awakening all who listen to it. My introduction to Mozart’s Requiem was many years ago when I watched Amadeus. I developed an obsession with this piece, repeatedly listening to the Berlin Philharmonic’s recording, featuring soprano Anna Tomowa-Sintow. When I saw it was on the Los Angeles Philharmonic’s season calendar in August 2017—featuring Gustavo Dudamel as the conductor— I lobbied my mother to let me see it (and forced her to take me on the 2-hour round trip to the Hollywood Bowl on a school night). As the concert approached, I listened to the Kyrie movement ten times a day, studying the structure of the movement. We will write a custom essay sample on LA Phil Concert: Mozarts Requiem at Hollywood Bowl by Los Angeles Philharmonic or any similar topic specifically for you Do Not WasteYour Time HIRE WRITER Only 13.90 / page I was very excited for this concert. The concert began, not with Mozart, but with Harmonium, a choral piece composed by John Adams in 1980. John Adams is a postmodernist minimalist composer, similar in style to composers Philip Glass and Steven Reich. Harmonium is written like a choral symphony, and is a background to three poems, corresponding to its three movements. The first movement, â€Å"Negative Love,† is based on the poem by John Donne and begins softly with an ethereal mood. Dudamel conducted this restrained piece in a reserved way, his baton keeping him in check. Although â€Å"Negative Love,† like the rest of Harmonium could be mistaken for ambient music, it creates a mysterious mood and possesses sufficient musical merit and complexity to avoid this label. Based on poems by Emily Dickinson, the following movements, â€Å"Because I Could Not Stop for Death† and â€Å"Wild Nights,† were similar in timbre, rhythm and varied mostly in volume. John Adams presented himself to the audie nce at the end of the first half and received the applause of the crowd, a nice reminder that all composers from all time periods were living breathing human beings at one point. That is, not all composers are dead. Next came the Requiem, the star of this show. The Requiem Mass was Mozart’s final work, as he died during its composition. Completed posthumously by Franz Sussmayr, one of Mozart’s pupils, Mozart’s Requiem is reminiscent of Baroque Cantatas, particularly in the fugal Kyrie movement. However, the Requiem is distinctly Classical for the majority of the work, with an overall homophonic texture and the key and rhythmic changes characteristic of this period. Softly, with a ,slow tempo, the Requiem began in the key of D Minor. The Introit – Requiem movement began with low strings and woodwinds. Building gradually, the chorus joined in, with a solo by the soprano, Miah Persson. Building to a climax, the movement then softened, and concludes. Dudamel let go of all restraint and dropped his baton for this second half, conducting solely using his passionate body motions. Next came my favorite movement. Kyrie is a choral double fugue with a lively tempo written in duple meter. This movement began with the words â€Å"Kyrie Eleison,† the primary six note subject of the fugue, followed by the secondary subject â€Å"Christie Eleison,† a fast ascending conjunctive phrase that rings out distinctively. This movement alternated between strings and chorus singing the subjects, with extreme kinetic energy. The sound of the LA Phil possessed a distinctive and agitated timbre. In the middle of the movement, the key of the subject changed to major, and built in volume and complexity. This movement ended with a loud subject, before continuing onto the Dies Irae movement. This movement, full of fire, ended with the tempo slowing, timbres becoming less harsh, and the whole character changing. The piece then moved into a call-and-response section with many bass and tenor voices. The movements progressed with similar texture and timbre, with the Lacrimosa section, and the Offertorium movement, before returning to a recapitulation of the Introit. After these inner sections, we returned to the Communio section, a repeat of the Requiem Aeternam and the Kyrie fugue. This piece ended grandly, leaving me full of awe with a bit of sorrow as the concert had come to an end. In reflection, the pairing of Harmonium by John Adams (1980), a contemporary minimalistic composer, and Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart’s Requiem Mass K.62 was an inspired choice. Both are choral works broken into short sections; both are meditations on death. In this way, Harmonium is a contemporary Requiem and a fresh compliment to Mozart’s Requiem. Having loved Mozart’s Requiem for many years, and having seen it once before (at the London’s Academy of St. Martin in the Fields in 2014), I was amazed at the quality and awe-inspiring nature of this piece and the Los Angeles Philharmonic, and I found Dudamel’s passionate interpretation of this marvelous work to be absolutely fantastic. I hope to see both Mozart’s Requiem and Dudamel in concert again in the future. After all, I have become even more convinced that I would like to play Mozart’s Requiem at my wedding.

Our Town Essays - English-language Films, Our Town, Thornton Wilder

Our Town Essays - English-language Films, Our Town, Thornton Wilder Our Town The book Our Town is a play written by Thorton Wilder in 1938. The play uses very little props and makes the audience use their imagination. People all are very different but they all experience the same things. The daily life is mostly the same for all people across the world. In the play Ms. Gibbs wakes up the kids. She makes them breakfast and packs their lunch. The Greeks did the same for their kids. Also in the play, the letter that Jane Crowfort got was addressed to the world, the universe, and everything in gods mind. That proves that Wilder is trying to state that everyone goes through waking their kids up and fixing them breakfast. Another thing that most people go through or experience is love and marriage. In this part of the play Wilder uses flashbacks to show how this happened. George is scared of growing up and getting married to Emily. His mom, Ms. Gibbs, said that when Doc Gibbs and her were getting married they felt that they wouldn?t have nothing to talk about. In the beginning of Act II the stage manager says ? Almost everybody in the world gets married-you know what I mean( Wilder 535). That is how Wilder states that everyone experiences love and marriage. People take life for granted while they live and do not appreciate life until they are gone. In this act Wilder lets Emily go back in time. Ms. Gibbs told Emily to go to the least important day of her life. Emily went to her twelve birthday. When she arrived at her house she was overwhelmed of how her mom looked at that age. Emily wanted her mom to look into her eyes for one last time. Ms. Gibbs didn?t so Emily went back to the grave yard. Emily told her mom that they don?t understand. Ms. Gibbs said that they don?t. They were talking about living don?t understand about life until they are dead. All three acts are about common experiences that everyone goes through. Wilder named the play Our Town because it could happen in any town in the world. Wilder says ?an attempt to find a value above all price for the smallest event in our daily life.?( Wilder Notes n.p.). This means that we all experience the same things in life, no matter what it is.

Theme Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words

Theme - Essay Example The immigrant experience is marked by the narrator of the last section who notes that life is smooth, though challenging. According to Lila’s parents, the movement to America presents them an opportunity for wealth which they would have not obtained in India. Nonetheless, Mrs. Sen flat-out refuses to assimilate due to her incapability to live without Indian life. In this scenario, marriage is an opportunity for happiness but also secrets and mysteries. Twinkle and Sanjeev have no arrangement in their marriage even though they are born in America. Despite of being together in marriage, each individual maintains  self feelings. Sanjeev is uncertain of love for his wife because of the disconnection. The toll of the child’s death moves Shukumar and Shoba’s marriage radically2. The two are no longer the same people as they met due to death and their attitudes are altered by the death. Hence, each romantic instance poses as a unique aspect in its own way. The author highlights the essence of communication. The author highlights the effect of secrecy in marriage and entails numerous feelings that can attribute to break up. For 3instance, Shukumar and Shoba got deprived of their own grief and halted communication with each other. The two have gained mistrust and can hardly believe that their union is still valid. The blackout enables Shukumar and Shoba to communicate the secrets, which they have never shared to each other. There is evident highlight of parent and child relations. The children’s relations change with their parents as they grow due to understanding they develop. There is an automatic truth between Eliot and the mother. Eliot is certain of his mother’s distress and his powerlessness over the situation. In contrast, the narrator nurses his mother when she becomes ill. Lilia, Eliot, and Rohin all recognize the grownups grief and offer high-level surveillance on the form of love and

Family Ties Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words

Family Ties - Essay Example We all know how important family ties are for people and how needful it is, to have someone close enough to support and understand you in any situation. Either parent in childhood or a spouse in the adult life is those who would never leave or betray. To my thinking, marriage ties are the strong connection between people similar to the connection existing between parents and children. As one begins his/her life journey and starts living separately from parents, a wife or a husband may become the most precious soul mate to accompany and help throughout one's life. People do not bear soul mates, they become soul mates, and it is the great happiness, to find such a soul mate. To me, my wife is the person I can always rely on, the person I can fully trust. And marriage is not a mere word for us. We are used to supporting and complementing each other, and living apart would be very hard and unhappy for both of us, especially living in different countries. I would like to be near her both in happy and sad moments and help her overcome all the hardships. This is what I promised to do when I married her. People say that when people love their souls come in touch with each other until they become a single whole. I am sure a husband and a wife have one soul for two, and tearing his soul apart would be very painful for both. Living alone without my wife here will be extremely hard for me: I am a man, and I want to be a tower of strength for the woman who is the dearest person to me.

Vark learning style Research Paper Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

Vark learning style - Research Paper Example Nilson (2010) said that the VARK (visual, aural, read/write, and kinesthetic) learning style assessment emphasizes on learning styles that utilize an individual’s senses (sight, touch, hearing). Fleming and Mills (1992) were the ones who came up with these classifications that mirror their students’ knowledge, involvement, and encounter when it comes to learning. According to Fleming (2011), individuals’ learning preferences are respectively assessed in the VARK Learning Style Questionnaire. Information being portrayed in symbols, colors, and other means like pie charts and fish diagrams can be readily absorbed by a student with a high visual preference. Those who score high in the aural mode can better recognize information via verbal means or other forms of audible media. For them, their sense of hearing is quite utilized in understanding data. Learners who received high results in their reading and writing category may pick up facts best when these are express ed in written words. As its category suggests, a person in this mode may prefer reading texts a lot as well as writing them. In the kinesthetic learning preference, a person’s experience is crucial in indicating his learning progress. Students in this mode would like to move and practice the concepts so they can better grasp the ideas being presented to them. For this group, experience is indeed the best mentor. The results in this questionnaire can reveal a person’s potential in learning.... Nowadays, almost anything can be accomplished with just a lift of a finger or a push of a button. Information that could be communicated in an hour through lecture can be depicted through multimedia in just 5 minutes. This kind of scenario is invading homes and minds of people. When individuals enter the classroom, many of them get uninterested especially when the teacher merely employs a single mode of instruction. Many students may get perked up when there is an involvement of power point presentations with relevant videos or pictures. Other learners feel that they can actually learn more when experience is incorporated into the discussion. Each student may have his own unique way of learning. As an example, there is a student who gained a percentage of 13 in visual, kinesthetic, as well as reading and writing. He got a percentage of 8 in the aural category. Using VARK, stability may be acquired by encouraging an educator to utilize different kinds of strategies and materials to ad dress the varied preferences of young minds. The student in this situation may help himself by incorporating techniques in his studying lifestyle. Since this person is noticeably multimodal, he may prefer understanding the lesson with the use of pictures and other figures, word games and mnemonics, including different kinds of movement. For instance, he can draw symbols on the side of his notes to give him a clue regarding the topic’s essence. He can also come up with acronyms to help him enumerate certain processes. Walking while memorizing or practicing a speech may also be beneficial. Analysis People do not need to be bothered for a long time with this kind of assessment. Since this type of questionnaire just employs a few items, it can be quickly answered.

Decentralization and Democratization in Indonesia

Decentralization and Democratization in Indonesia Chapter Six Lessons and Implications The changes in Indonesia have been incrementalWe still have the New Order, or most of it. Anyway, the corrosive parts are still reigning in. We have a new administration but the New Order keeps coming back in various ways. Dwight T. King[1] It is a paradox that, in an era when democracy seems to have emerged as the single most acceptable form of political organization, more and more people in both mature and young democracies are disengaging from the political process. Knight, Chigudu Tandon (2002) †¦a breakdown of an authoritarian regime may be reversed†¦even if democracy is established, it need not be consolidated. Under certain conditions, democratic institutions may systematically generate outcomes that cause some politically important forces to opt for authoritarianism. Hence, consolidated democracy is only one among the possible outcomes of breakdown of authoritarian regimes. Pzeworski (1991: 51) Introduction The discussion in previous chapters provides a foundation for important theoretical insights regarding the nature and the significance of decentralization in Indonesia, as well as its relation to democratization in the regions. I have emphasized how decentralization practices in the regions promote popular participation in local political processes beyond electoral participation. By and large, the experiences of Bandung District and City of Cirebon in implementing decentralization between 1945 and 2006 lend support to the argument that decentralization does not necessarily lead to the growth of local democracy within which local ordinary people are able to exert their power to significantly influence local decision-making process. Although promoting democracy has become one of the stated goals of several decentralization laws, their enforcement in both regions has not promoted meaningful inclusion of local ordinary people in local political processes beyond electoral participation. In fact, it has been the weakest point of decentralization practices in both regions. Overall, the two case studies share a similar theme, namely that power remains actually concentrated in the hands of local elites and hence, local communities are constantly marginalized. Against this backdrop, in this chapter, I will examine a number of factors which have circumscribed the democr atic potential of the decentralization program in Indonesia. Based on the experiences of a variety of countries, some theorists suggest that successful decentralization policies are contingent upon certain individual or collective prerequisites. These include: a high degree of central state capacity, a well developed civil society, strong political will among national as well as local political elites, strong social support, a long experience of democracy, a well-established multi-party system, strong enabling legal frameworks, and a culture of accountability, etc (Rondinelli, McCullough Johnson 1989: 77-78; Crook Manor 1995: 327; Ardaya Thevoz 2001: 220; Heller 2001: 138-139). Regarding this assertion, analysts also emphasize that the extent to which these conditions work varies across countries. This means that some conditions work relatively well in certain countries, but in others they do not effectively facilitate the stated goals of decentralization policies (Kulipossa 2004: 771). In addition, Smoke (2003: 12) and Kulipossa (2004: 772 ) also draw attention to the fact that there are cases where decentralization can achieve its potential benefits in the absence of those conditions, as well as cases where most of those prerequisites are in place, but decentralization has been undermined. Against the above line of thought, I would argue here that to a certain extent, the unfulfilled democratic potential of decentralization practices in Bandung and Cirebon can also be associated with the absence of some of the above favourable conditions. These include weak political will among both national and local political authorities, the absence of a vibrant civil society, and the lack of an attentive public. Needless to say, these factors vary across time and regimes. Above all, the absence of these favourable conditions for fulfilling the democratic potential of decentralization appears to result from three aspects: first, all along, decentralization in Indonesia has been perceived and embraced by Indonesian political elites mainly as a matter of political strategy; second, the long-standing authoritarian system of government; and third, the primacy of pragmatic over political decentralization approach, both normatively and empirically. Decentralization in Indonesia: a matter of regimes political strategy? Among the most important factors which determines the design and the actual practices of decentralization and in turn, its expected consequences (e.g., improving public service delivery, maintaining national integration and promoting local democracy) is the motivation of key actors in adopting the policy in the first place (Selee Tulchin 2004). The experiences of many developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, for instance, attest that the motives of politicians that embrace decentralization policies are not necessarily as virtuous as those who design them. In fact, Smoke and Gomez (2006 : 351; see also, for example, Eaton 2001a; Shah Thompson 2004: 3-4) observe that despite the efficiency and good governance rhetoric surrounding decentralization, the underlying impetus has been inherently political, meaning that the adoption of decentralization has been linked to central governments desire to accomplish their own particular political interests. The factors underlying political interest are country and regime specific. They include, for instance, shoring up their legitimacy in the eyes of citizens usually amidst national political crisis, competition with rival political parties for popular support, pressure from subnational governments for more powers, and opportunity for a ruling party to consolidate power (Selee Tulchin 2004: 299-302; Smoke Gomez 2006 : 351). Many observers believe that these kinds of political motives have partly accounted for the failure of decentralization practices in many developing countries to deliver its democratic potential (Eaton 2001a; Friedman Kihato 2004; Oxhorn 2004). Indonesias decentralization experience is not an exception to the above phenomenon. Although promoting democratization has been one of the stated goals of Indonesias decentralization programs, there has been significant gap between rhetoric and reality. The continuous marginalization of local people from local political processes has been partly rooted in the ‘undemocratic political motives of both national and local political elites in adopting and implementing decentralization policy. As explained in Chapter Three, decentralization in Indonesia has never been constructed in a political vacuum. Hence, I would argue that the degree, pattern and process of decentralization has been strongly influenced by, borrowing Montero and Samuels term (2004: 5), political determinants, i.e., regime responses to changing conditions and incentives within the context of rapid political and economic changes. During the revolution era, decentralization policies recognized the principle of extensive autonomy in all regions of the newly independent Republic. However, such policies were actually constructed by national political elites as a means of establishing and maintaining national authority over many already operating local governments in those regions previously occupied by the colonial government. The polices were also constructed to fulfill other political ends, namely to gain international recognition, as contained in both Law No. 1 of 1945 and No. 22 of 1948 in the face of Dutch accusations that Indonesia was a puppet state of the Japanese. Thus, despite official claims that decentralization was embraced as an indispensable strategy in materializing a democratic system due to the countrys size and diverse characteristics, the embrace of the policy during this period was not genuinely related to the intention of developing meaningful democratic system within the country since those two basic laws were not followed by any clear operational directions whatsoever on how a democratic system of government would be crafted on the ground. This claim is underscored by the fact that there was no significant alteration in terms of local political processes in Bandung, Cirebon or other regions in the country. As Maryanov (1958: 9) also observed, Many of the institutions and practices adopted or utilized by independent Indonesia have been reflections of those established by the Netherlands East Indies†¦alterations in governmental structure turned out to be minor†¦patterns of administrative behavior remained rooted in the Dutch traditional procedures. Accordingly, the experiences of both Bandung and Cirebon during post-independence until mid 1950s revealed that, except for the establishment of local government structures, the enforcement of Law No. 1 of 1945 and No. 22 of 1948 allowed neither effective decentralization nor democratization in the regions. Needless to say, the political situation during revolutionary era also contributed to the limited enforcement of the policies in the regions. By the same token, there were three decisive political factors which led national political elites to adopt advanced decentralization policy as contained in Law No. 1 of 1957 which â€Å"greatly increased the power of elected legislative councils in the provinces, regencies, and municipalities† and set for wider regional authority vis-à  -vis the central government (Feith 1962: 552). These factors were, first, a kind of political promise by the government of Republic of Indonesia to the former constituent states of the Republic of the United States of Indonesiaà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢a federal structure created by the Dutchà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢ when they voluntarily decided to join the Republic of Indonesia to establish the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Second, the electoral calculations of various political parties in the Constituent Assembly to have wider mass bases in the regions and to play more influential roles in regional politics. And third, forestalling regional rebellions rooted in growing regional dissatisfaction concerning the central governments unfulfilled promises to carry out development. This was intertwined with other issues such as ethnic tension, economic imbalance and political rivalry between politicians in Java and the Outer Islands. Accordingly, most of the advanced provisions within Law No. 1 were considered to be immediate responses to the above political factors, such as the recognition of the principle of extensive autonomy which was applied based on the capacity of respective local governments and the election of heads of regions by the DPRDs. In addition, the direct election of members of the DPRD and the issuance of Indonesias first Fiscal Balance Law within the same year were also seen as inseparable efforts by national political elites to respond to those political factors. In turn, however, similar to its predecessors, such pragmatic and short term political calculations by national political elites prevented decentralization achieving its idealized outcomes. As Bandung and Cirebons experiences attest, until late 1950s, there was relatively little effective power actually decentralized. In addition, one might conclude that with the introduction of direct election of DPRD members and the election of head of region by the DPRD, local democracy was being crafted on the ground. However, it was not accompanied by channels of popular participation beyond the election. Recapping the above political motives in adopting such advances provisions in Law No. 1, neither central government policy makers nor democratically elected local governments in either case study considered this issue as among their political goals. Accordingly, the two case studies demonstrate that the dynamic of political parties and decentralization practices in Bandung and Cirebon clearly d id not make local political process more open to participation by local people. Decentralization practices during the Sukarno and Suharto eras obviously confirm the argument that decentralization can be applied within authoritarian regime (Eaton 2001a: 3; Montero Samuels 2004: 10). These cases, however, it was by no means aimed at achieving the various virtues routinely discussed by democratization theorists, but rather at tightening their control over the apparatus of local government at all levels in order to facilitate an authoritarian system. This was particularly fulfilled by making both subnational executives and legislatures appointed and hence, accountable to the national authorities. Thus, these local apparatus were nothing but the instruments of central government with their main function representing the central governments interests in the regions. Yet again, such decentralization was not made in a political vacuum. Prior to the enforcement of Presidential Edict No. 6 of 1959 concerning Regional Government and Presidential Edict No. 5 of 1960 regarding the Gotong Royong Regional Representative Council and Regional Secretariat (Sekretaris Daerah), Indonesia was hit by escalating political turbulence due to the outbreak of rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi, the repeated collapse of governing coalitions at the national level in addition to the failure of the Constituent Assembly to make a replacement for the Provisional 1950 Constitution. In turn, these aspects triggered the issuance of a wave of government regulations by Sukarno intended to overhaul the system of government based on his personal concept of Guided Democracyà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Ã¢â‚¬ a democracy with a leadership†(van der Kroef 1957: 115). This concept was believed to be an alternative to troublesome â€Å"Western concepts of parliamentary democracy† wh ich had supposedly led to the above political turbulence due to the weakness of government authority and the vehemence of political opposition (van der Kroef 1957: 113). Thus, the new arrangements in local governance were specifically aimed at facilitating Sukarnos own concept of Guided Democracy, which required a total subservience of local governments to central government policies. Sukarno himself was closely involved in setting in place local government institutions, such as heads of regions and local councils. Suharto did not loosen up central control when he took over from Sukarno following the abortive conspiracy by left-wing officers in 1965 until his demise in 1998 (Malley 1999: 75). In fact, severe economic and political crisis inherited from the previous regime contributed to the deepening of authoritarianism that fostered a highly centralized system of government. Suhartos regime believed that this mode of government could retain political and economic stability as its ultimate basis for overcoming the crisis. Another important determinant of Suhartos centralistic policy towards local government system was the need to establish and consolidate an effective government administration over the vast and diverse country (MacAndrews 1986: 27-30). In turn, these variables contributed to the centralistic nature of New Orders ‘decentralization law ¾Law No. 5 of 1974 concerning The Basic Principle of Government in the Regional Government through which â€Å"the regions had neither in fluence over national government policies nor the power to control their own affairs† (Aspinall Fealy 2003: 2). In essence, throughout Suhartos regime, local governments were mainly as implementers of various policies constructed and financially supported by the central government. Thus, both the Sukarno and Suharto regime indeed continued to adopt ‘decentralization policies as represented by the existence of the above law and regulations. However, all were intended to facilitate central government control and greater penetration of society in order to repress vehemence political opposition so that all central government policies and interests would be efficiently implemented down to the lowest level of governments without any resistance. Needless to say, such a mode of ‘decentralization provided no space for citizen participation. Many Indonesians had great hopes that the so-called ‘Big Bang approach to decentralization launched in 2001 would at last bring into reality the various potential benefits of the policy, including democratic local governance. However, various studies (e.g., Anggraini 2007; The Asia Foundation, 2002a; The Asia Foundation, 2002b; Wardana 2007) including two case studies discussed in previous chapters confirm that the decentralization practices have gone without meaningful opening up institutional spaces for greater citizen participation, even though, promoting local democratic governance was among the stated goals of the ‘Big Bang approach. Yet again, a key problem was that realizing democratic potential was not among the main goals of the national political elites when they adopted the policy. Rather, as explained in Chapter Three, the ‘Big Bang policy was motivated by a number of crucial political determinants that had little to do with developing local democracy or even with the neo-liberal agenda of achieving a more effective and efficient public service. These included forestalling national disintegration amidst the emergence of separatist movements and the vocal demands for more autonomy from some resource-rich regions (Sukma 2003: 65; Hidayat Antlov 2004: 271; Hofman Kaiser 2004: 17) ; restoring the legitimacy of the state as well as national elites following the collapse of Suhartos regime, severe economic crisis, and the loss of East Timor (Smoke Gomez 2006 : 353); transferring financial burdens from the center to the regions amidst dramatic decline of central governments financial capacity following t he economic crisis of 1997-1999 (Hidayat Antlov 2004: 271-272); and, no less important, electoral calculus of Habibies to garner the support of the regions prior to the presidential elections (Hofman Kaiser 2004: 17). It was for these strategic reasons, few of which were related to democracy, that the government was willing to embrace a radical approach to decentralization. Further consequence, as attested in Bandung District and City of Cirebon cases, neither clear and firm central governments policies or programs, nor local governance meaningfully accommodated the rhetoric of promoting democratization into reality. Although it was often argued that local democracy was strengthened through the significant empowerment of DPRD vis-à  -vis head of region (Rasyid 2003), this mechanism of political representation in fact could not deliver effective accomplishment of what Fung and Wright (2003: 3) called, the central ideas of democratic politics: facilitating active political involvement of the citizenry, forging political consensus through dialogue, devising and implementing public policies that ground a productive economy and healthy society, and, in more radical egalitarian versions of the democratic ideal, assuring that all citizens benefit from the nations wealth. The enforcement of Indonesias latest decentralization lawà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Law No. 32 of 2004à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢did not make local political processes more inclusive either, since the law was not motivated by the intention to so. On the surface, it might appear that the formulation of the law was driven by the intention of the Megawati administration to curb the emergence of various abuses of Law No. 22 of 1999, such as rampant corruption and blatant money politics, ethnic parochialism, and the proliferation of excessive taxes which had led to a high cost economy to name some of the most worrying signs. Many perceived that all of these problems were rooted in imperfect laws and the lack of a clearly designed plan (Turner et al. 2003; Legowo 2003; Legowo Djadijono n.d). More compelling is the argument that the attempt was a straightforward act of re-centralization. Such an act is particularly rooted in the nature of decentralization itself, which is not merely as an administrative business, but rather it involves the distributional struggles between national and subnational elites regarding control over local resources (Slater Watson 1989: 511; Montero 2001: 44-45; Hadiz 2003b: 123). Accordingly, meaningful decentralization always faces enormous political obstacles and can be subjected to serious setbacks. One of the salient challenges is the preference of national elites to slow down the process of decentralization and to reinforce their attempts to control it. As Eaton (2001b: 102) suggests, â€Å"national politicians can and do continue to use their legislative authority to modify the initial decision to decentralize†. Thus, for national politicians, â€Å"decentralization is neither inevitable nor irreversible† (Eaton 2001b: 101). I would suggest that the enforcement of the latest Indonesias decentralization lawà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Law No. 32 of 2004à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢perfectly supports this line of argument. This contention is further strengthened by the fact that Law No. 32 restores and strengthens the province and the Ministry of Home Affairs positions in regional affairs at the expense of district governments authority (Eko 2005: 27-29; Ryaas Rashid as cited in Myala 2005). The only new provision within Law No. 32 of 2004 embraced by many as a significant leap in decentralization and local democratization efforts regarded the direct election of heads of regions However, as Fung and Wright argues (2003: 3), the election of both legislative and executive offices are not sufficient to accommodate the influence of local ordinary people on local political processes beyond the election. As the experiences of Bandung and Cirebon attest, there has not been any significant alteration in terms of developing inclusive local political process in the aftermath of the head of region elections. It must be admitted that the promulgation of Local Regulation on Transparency and Participation in Bandung District in 2004 was actually a progressive step in institutionalizing active political involvement of local people. However, it has not been effectively implemented yet. Lack of political will on the part of local to consistently implement the regulation has ensured that it has had only rhetorical value. The claim that popular participation has been channeled through the annual development planning process is specious, since the process is actually still strongly dominated by local government officers. New arrangements in local governance based on Law No. 32 have in fact significantly reduced the power of DPRDs vis-à  -vis heads of regions, since the former no longer have the power to elect and to hold the latter accountable, as regulated in the previous decentralization law. The head of region is now accountable to the central authorities with the president at the apex of the hierarchy. Thus, from a representative democracy point of view, there has been a significant retreat as well. Thus, the lesson seems to be that decentralization in Indonesia has been pursued mainly as a political strategy to fulfill certain political ends, particularly those of national elites within the context of political and economic crisis. Deepening democracy has never been the driving force behind decentralization reform. It is therefore no surprise that we find a lack of political will to realize the democratic potential of decentralization policies at any stage of Indonesias history. Smoke (2003: 12) points out that among the most ubiquitous claims regarding impediments to decentralizations success is the lack of strong political will from various stakeholders involved in the process. Theorists do not all mean the same thing when they talk about ‘political will. For some theorists, strong political will can be seen from the existence of constitutional or legal instruments made by political elites, both national and local (Rondinelli, McCullough Johnson 1989: 77-78; Smoke 2003 : 12). Nevertheless, since many cases also show that decentralization policies cannot attain their intended goals,[2] theorists also emphasize that constitutional and legal instruments are not sufficient to ensure workable decentralization policies. As Isaac (2001: 9) firmly argues, Fundamental reforms cannot be merely legislated. Legislation remains empty phrases unless powerful movements oversee their implementation. Legislation is necessary but not sufficient for decentralization. Accordingly, as Rondinelli (1983: 198-200) highlights, political will must also be measured from the actual realization of those normative arrangements particularly by central political authorities transferring planning, decision-making and managerial authority to lower levels of governments, and also by local political authorities sharing their authority with local citizens through opening up effective channels for political participation so that local citizens, especially the poor and marginalized ones, are able to express their needs and demands and to press claims or national and local development resources. Thus, this dimension of political will is also essential, since in many cases, normative arrangements of decentralization are often used to facilitate political aims that have little to do with devolving power to lower level of governments and utilizing this power to effectively fulfill local peoples needs and demands. As Crook (2003: 85-86) stresses, in some African countrie s the real goal is often to consolidate power through political parties and local elites, or to deliberately neutralize local ethnic challenges through fragmenting â€Å"potential local power bases into smaller, weaker, politically insignificant units†. Based on the above line of thought, the lack of political will in pursuing the democratic potential of Indonesias decentralization can be viewed from different perspectives. Normatively, even though the embrace of the policy may initially be claimed to be an indispensable strategy to develop a democratic system of government, its subsequent adoption within constitutions and some existing decentralization laws as well as their operational regulations in the regions so far has never been clear, firm, and consistent. Neither constitutions nor basic legislation and its subsequent operational regulations explicitly note that promoting local democracy is among the intended goals of decentralization programs. During the New Order era, Development Planning (Perencanaan Pembangunan), which was regulated within the Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation of 1982 (Permendagri No. 9/1982), was claimed to be adopting a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches. Empirically, however, as proven in the experiences of Bandung District and City of Cirebon, the planning process was actually highly centralized and practically excluded public participation. The local governments development planning processes were nothing but breaking down the centrally planned parameters. One might find that this was not the case during the post-Suharto era, particularly with regard to Law No.22 of 1999 and Law No. 32 of 2004. Indeed, some argue that Law No. 22 in particular, was intended to promote local democracy and participation, as evident in its preamble: â€Å"in the implementation of Regional Autonomy is deemed to be necessary to emphasize more the principles of democracy, public participation, equal distribution and fairness, and considering the potential and regional diversity† (Turner et al. 2003: 23; see also, Jaya Dick 2001: 216). However, it appears that further details on how local democracy would be implemented on the ground were actually ill-defined. The national government in fact issued a separate regulation, i.e. Government Regulation No. 68 of 1999 regarding public participation in the governmental process.[3] From the title of the regulation, one might easily assume that it was regarding peoples involvement in the governments policy-making process. But, it was actually not. The regulation was actually more about peoples rights rather than facilitating popular participation. Four rights were mentioned: the right to obtain and give information regarding governmental process; the right to get fair service from the government; the right to give advice to the government policies; and the right to legal protection (perlindungan hukum).[4] Thus, the Government Regulation did not specifically mention that popular participation would be the essential component of the government policy-making process. In addition, knowing that popular participation was framed in terms of rights, it means that it was set on voluntary basis. I believe t hat such setting provided weak encouragement for the public to be engaged in governmental process. In the case of Law No. 32, its prologue reads, †¦local government, which manages and oversees its own governmental affairs based on the principles of decentralization and medebewind (co-operating administration) , is directed towards boosting people welfare through service improvement, empowerment, and popular participation, as well as improving regional competitiveness by taking into account the principles of democracy, equal distribution, fairness, specialness (keistimewaan), and specific characteristics (kekhususan) of a region within the system of Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia. From the above prologue, there would appear to be no significant difference between Law No. 22 and Law No. 32. However, one might argue that central government, as the main architect of the law, showed stronger political will to uphold local democracy in Law No. 32 rather than its predecessor, based on two novel articles within the law, i.e. Article 56 (1) regarding the direct election of head and deputy head of local government and Article 139 (1) which stated that â€Å"Local community has the right to provide input verbally or in writing for the preparation of or during the deliberation of a proposed bill.† Direct election of head and deputy head of local government is undeniably desirable since, as Peterson (1997: 14) argues, indirect elections have â€Å"tended to perpetuate the strength of political insiders, who are often more accountable to their party hierarchy than to the public at large†. Nevertheless, further analysis of other articles reveals that direct el ection of head and deputy head of local government actually lacked democratic orientation in three aspects: first, the election process was practically dominated by political parties maneuvers, especially during the selection of the candidates for head and deputy head of local government, which is prone to power abuse by ‘selling the office to the highest bidder; second, there was strong intervention from national political party boards in determining the candidates; and third, the election gave no opportunity for independent candidates (Legowo Djadijono n.d). Hence, in the end, local communities have become the last component in the whole series of the election process. In other words, the novel provisions regarding the direct election of head and deputy head of local government only left the local community marginalized. More importantly, direct election is insufficient for developing strong local democracy since â€Å"elections occur infrequently and allow for only limited citizen input or feedback regarding specific local concerns or policy options† (Posner 2004: 57). Strong local democracy, Posner argues, needs to be backed up by active political participation of local constituencies beyond the mere act of voting. With regard to Article 139 (1), it appears that popular participation was provided for on a voluntarily basis. What I am pointing out here is that the article indicates that popular participation in local policy making process was not an essential factor in the process. This point is underlined by the fact that there were no other provisions within Law No. 32 which obligated local government institutions to engage the local community meaningfully in the process. Decentralization and Democratization in Indonesia Decentralization and Democratization in Indonesia Chapter Six Lessons and Implications The changes in Indonesia have been incrementalWe still have the New Order, or most of it. Anyway, the corrosive parts are still reigning in. We have a new administration but the New Order keeps coming back in various ways. Dwight T. King[1] It is a paradox that, in an era when democracy seems to have emerged as the single most acceptable form of political organization, more and more people in both mature and young democracies are disengaging from the political process. Knight, Chigudu Tandon (2002) †¦a breakdown of an authoritarian regime may be reversed†¦even if democracy is established, it need not be consolidated. Under certain conditions, democratic institutions may systematically generate outcomes that cause some politically important forces to opt for authoritarianism. Hence, consolidated democracy is only one among the possible outcomes of breakdown of authoritarian regimes. Pzeworski (1991: 51) Introduction The discussion in previous chapters provides a foundation for important theoretical insights regarding the nature and the significance of decentralization in Indonesia, as well as its relation to democratization in the regions. I have emphasized how decentralization practices in the regions promote popular participation in local political processes beyond electoral participation. By and large, the experiences of Bandung District and City of Cirebon in implementing decentralization between 1945 and 2006 lend support to the argument that decentralization does not necessarily lead to the growth of local democracy within which local ordinary people are able to exert their power to significantly influence local decision-making process. Although promoting democracy has become one of the stated goals of several decentralization laws, their enforcement in both regions has not promoted meaningful inclusion of local ordinary people in local political processes beyond electoral participation. In fact, it has been the weakest point of decentralization practices in both regions. Overall, the two case studies share a similar theme, namely that power remains actually concentrated in the hands of local elites and hence, local communities are constantly marginalized. Against this backdrop, in this chapter, I will examine a number of factors which have circumscribed the democr atic potential of the decentralization program in Indonesia. Based on the experiences of a variety of countries, some theorists suggest that successful decentralization policies are contingent upon certain individual or collective prerequisites. These include: a high degree of central state capacity, a well developed civil society, strong political will among national as well as local political elites, strong social support, a long experience of democracy, a well-established multi-party system, strong enabling legal frameworks, and a culture of accountability, etc (Rondinelli, McCullough Johnson 1989: 77-78; Crook Manor 1995: 327; Ardaya Thevoz 2001: 220; Heller 2001: 138-139). Regarding this assertion, analysts also emphasize that the extent to which these conditions work varies across countries. This means that some conditions work relatively well in certain countries, but in others they do not effectively facilitate the stated goals of decentralization policies (Kulipossa 2004: 771). In addition, Smoke (2003: 12) and Kulipossa (2004: 772 ) also draw attention to the fact that there are cases where decentralization can achieve its potential benefits in the absence of those conditions, as well as cases where most of those prerequisites are in place, but decentralization has been undermined. Against the above line of thought, I would argue here that to a certain extent, the unfulfilled democratic potential of decentralization practices in Bandung and Cirebon can also be associated with the absence of some of the above favourable conditions. These include weak political will among both national and local political authorities, the absence of a vibrant civil society, and the lack of an attentive public. Needless to say, these factors vary across time and regimes. Above all, the absence of these favourable conditions for fulfilling the democratic potential of decentralization appears to result from three aspects: first, all along, decentralization in Indonesia has been perceived and embraced by Indonesian political elites mainly as a matter of political strategy; second, the long-standing authoritarian system of government; and third, the primacy of pragmatic over political decentralization approach, both normatively and empirically. Decentralization in Indonesia: a matter of regimes political strategy? Among the most important factors which determines the design and the actual practices of decentralization and in turn, its expected consequences (e.g., improving public service delivery, maintaining national integration and promoting local democracy) is the motivation of key actors in adopting the policy in the first place (Selee Tulchin 2004). The experiences of many developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, for instance, attest that the motives of politicians that embrace decentralization policies are not necessarily as virtuous as those who design them. In fact, Smoke and Gomez (2006 : 351; see also, for example, Eaton 2001a; Shah Thompson 2004: 3-4) observe that despite the efficiency and good governance rhetoric surrounding decentralization, the underlying impetus has been inherently political, meaning that the adoption of decentralization has been linked to central governments desire to accomplish their own particular political interests. The factors underlying political interest are country and regime specific. They include, for instance, shoring up their legitimacy in the eyes of citizens usually amidst national political crisis, competition with rival political parties for popular support, pressure from subnational governments for more powers, and opportunity for a ruling party to consolidate power (Selee Tulchin 2004: 299-302; Smoke Gomez 2006 : 351). Many observers believe that these kinds of political motives have partly accounted for the failure of decentralization practices in many developing countries to deliver its democratic potential (Eaton 2001a; Friedman Kihato 2004; Oxhorn 2004). Indonesias decentralization experience is not an exception to the above phenomenon. Although promoting democratization has been one of the stated goals of Indonesias decentralization programs, there has been significant gap between rhetoric and reality. The continuous marginalization of local people from local political processes has been partly rooted in the ‘undemocratic political motives of both national and local political elites in adopting and implementing decentralization policy. As explained in Chapter Three, decentralization in Indonesia has never been constructed in a political vacuum. Hence, I would argue that the degree, pattern and process of decentralization has been strongly influenced by, borrowing Montero and Samuels term (2004: 5), political determinants, i.e., regime responses to changing conditions and incentives within the context of rapid political and economic changes. During the revolution era, decentralization policies recognized the principle of extensive autonomy in all regions of the newly independent Republic. However, such policies were actually constructed by national political elites as a means of establishing and maintaining national authority over many already operating local governments in those regions previously occupied by the colonial government. The polices were also constructed to fulfill other political ends, namely to gain international recognition, as contained in both Law No. 1 of 1945 and No. 22 of 1948 in the face of Dutch accusations that Indonesia was a puppet state of the Japanese. Thus, despite official claims that decentralization was embraced as an indispensable strategy in materializing a democratic system due to the countrys size and diverse characteristics, the embrace of the policy during this period was not genuinely related to the intention of developing meaningful democratic system within the country since those two basic laws were not followed by any clear operational directions whatsoever on how a democratic system of government would be crafted on the ground. This claim is underscored by the fact that there was no significant alteration in terms of local political processes in Bandung, Cirebon or other regions in the country. As Maryanov (1958: 9) also observed, Many of the institutions and practices adopted or utilized by independent Indonesia have been reflections of those established by the Netherlands East Indies†¦alterations in governmental structure turned out to be minor†¦patterns of administrative behavior remained rooted in the Dutch traditional procedures. Accordingly, the experiences of both Bandung and Cirebon during post-independence until mid 1950s revealed that, except for the establishment of local government structures, the enforcement of Law No. 1 of 1945 and No. 22 of 1948 allowed neither effective decentralization nor democratization in the regions. Needless to say, the political situation during revolutionary era also contributed to the limited enforcement of the policies in the regions. By the same token, there were three decisive political factors which led national political elites to adopt advanced decentralization policy as contained in Law No. 1 of 1957 which â€Å"greatly increased the power of elected legislative councils in the provinces, regencies, and municipalities† and set for wider regional authority vis-à  -vis the central government (Feith 1962: 552). These factors were, first, a kind of political promise by the government of Republic of Indonesia to the former constituent states of the Republic of the United States of Indonesiaà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢a federal structure created by the Dutchà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢ when they voluntarily decided to join the Republic of Indonesia to establish the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Second, the electoral calculations of various political parties in the Constituent Assembly to have wider mass bases in the regions and to play more influential roles in regional politics. And third, forestalling regional rebellions rooted in growing regional dissatisfaction concerning the central governments unfulfilled promises to carry out development. This was intertwined with other issues such as ethnic tension, economic imbalance and political rivalry between politicians in Java and the Outer Islands. Accordingly, most of the advanced provisions within Law No. 1 were considered to be immediate responses to the above political factors, such as the recognition of the principle of extensive autonomy which was applied based on the capacity of respective local governments and the election of heads of regions by the DPRDs. In addition, the direct election of members of the DPRD and the issuance of Indonesias first Fiscal Balance Law within the same year were also seen as inseparable efforts by national political elites to respond to those political factors. In turn, however, similar to its predecessors, such pragmatic and short term political calculations by national political elites prevented decentralization achieving its idealized outcomes. As Bandung and Cirebons experiences attest, until late 1950s, there was relatively little effective power actually decentralized. In addition, one might conclude that with the introduction of direct election of DPRD members and the election of head of region by the DPRD, local democracy was being crafted on the ground. However, it was not accompanied by channels of popular participation beyond the election. Recapping the above political motives in adopting such advances provisions in Law No. 1, neither central government policy makers nor democratically elected local governments in either case study considered this issue as among their political goals. Accordingly, the two case studies demonstrate that the dynamic of political parties and decentralization practices in Bandung and Cirebon clearly d id not make local political process more open to participation by local people. Decentralization practices during the Sukarno and Suharto eras obviously confirm the argument that decentralization can be applied within authoritarian regime (Eaton 2001a: 3; Montero Samuels 2004: 10). These cases, however, it was by no means aimed at achieving the various virtues routinely discussed by democratization theorists, but rather at tightening their control over the apparatus of local government at all levels in order to facilitate an authoritarian system. This was particularly fulfilled by making both subnational executives and legislatures appointed and hence, accountable to the national authorities. Thus, these local apparatus were nothing but the instruments of central government with their main function representing the central governments interests in the regions. Yet again, such decentralization was not made in a political vacuum. Prior to the enforcement of Presidential Edict No. 6 of 1959 concerning Regional Government and Presidential Edict No. 5 of 1960 regarding the Gotong Royong Regional Representative Council and Regional Secretariat (Sekretaris Daerah), Indonesia was hit by escalating political turbulence due to the outbreak of rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi, the repeated collapse of governing coalitions at the national level in addition to the failure of the Constituent Assembly to make a replacement for the Provisional 1950 Constitution. In turn, these aspects triggered the issuance of a wave of government regulations by Sukarno intended to overhaul the system of government based on his personal concept of Guided Democracyà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Ã¢â‚¬ a democracy with a leadership†(van der Kroef 1957: 115). This concept was believed to be an alternative to troublesome â€Å"Western concepts of parliamentary democracy† wh ich had supposedly led to the above political turbulence due to the weakness of government authority and the vehemence of political opposition (van der Kroef 1957: 113). Thus, the new arrangements in local governance were specifically aimed at facilitating Sukarnos own concept of Guided Democracy, which required a total subservience of local governments to central government policies. Sukarno himself was closely involved in setting in place local government institutions, such as heads of regions and local councils. Suharto did not loosen up central control when he took over from Sukarno following the abortive conspiracy by left-wing officers in 1965 until his demise in 1998 (Malley 1999: 75). In fact, severe economic and political crisis inherited from the previous regime contributed to the deepening of authoritarianism that fostered a highly centralized system of government. Suhartos regime believed that this mode of government could retain political and economic stability as its ultimate basis for overcoming the crisis. Another important determinant of Suhartos centralistic policy towards local government system was the need to establish and consolidate an effective government administration over the vast and diverse country (MacAndrews 1986: 27-30). In turn, these variables contributed to the centralistic nature of New Orders ‘decentralization law ¾Law No. 5 of 1974 concerning The Basic Principle of Government in the Regional Government through which â€Å"the regions had neither in fluence over national government policies nor the power to control their own affairs† (Aspinall Fealy 2003: 2). In essence, throughout Suhartos regime, local governments were mainly as implementers of various policies constructed and financially supported by the central government. Thus, both the Sukarno and Suharto regime indeed continued to adopt ‘decentralization policies as represented by the existence of the above law and regulations. However, all were intended to facilitate central government control and greater penetration of society in order to repress vehemence political opposition so that all central government policies and interests would be efficiently implemented down to the lowest level of governments without any resistance. Needless to say, such a mode of ‘decentralization provided no space for citizen participation. Many Indonesians had great hopes that the so-called ‘Big Bang approach to decentralization launched in 2001 would at last bring into reality the various potential benefits of the policy, including democratic local governance. However, various studies (e.g., Anggraini 2007; The Asia Foundation, 2002a; The Asia Foundation, 2002b; Wardana 2007) including two case studies discussed in previous chapters confirm that the decentralization practices have gone without meaningful opening up institutional spaces for greater citizen participation, even though, promoting local democratic governance was among the stated goals of the ‘Big Bang approach. Yet again, a key problem was that realizing democratic potential was not among the main goals of the national political elites when they adopted the policy. Rather, as explained in Chapter Three, the ‘Big Bang policy was motivated by a number of crucial political determinants that had little to do with developing local democracy or even with the neo-liberal agenda of achieving a more effective and efficient public service. These included forestalling national disintegration amidst the emergence of separatist movements and the vocal demands for more autonomy from some resource-rich regions (Sukma 2003: 65; Hidayat Antlov 2004: 271; Hofman Kaiser 2004: 17) ; restoring the legitimacy of the state as well as national elites following the collapse of Suhartos regime, severe economic crisis, and the loss of East Timor (Smoke Gomez 2006 : 353); transferring financial burdens from the center to the regions amidst dramatic decline of central governments financial capacity following t he economic crisis of 1997-1999 (Hidayat Antlov 2004: 271-272); and, no less important, electoral calculus of Habibies to garner the support of the regions prior to the presidential elections (Hofman Kaiser 2004: 17). It was for these strategic reasons, few of which were related to democracy, that the government was willing to embrace a radical approach to decentralization. Further consequence, as attested in Bandung District and City of Cirebon cases, neither clear and firm central governments policies or programs, nor local governance meaningfully accommodated the rhetoric of promoting democratization into reality. Although it was often argued that local democracy was strengthened through the significant empowerment of DPRD vis-à  -vis head of region (Rasyid 2003), this mechanism of political representation in fact could not deliver effective accomplishment of what Fung and Wright (2003: 3) called, the central ideas of democratic politics: facilitating active political involvement of the citizenry, forging political consensus through dialogue, devising and implementing public policies that ground a productive economy and healthy society, and, in more radical egalitarian versions of the democratic ideal, assuring that all citizens benefit from the nations wealth. The enforcement of Indonesias latest decentralization lawà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Law No. 32 of 2004à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢did not make local political processes more inclusive either, since the law was not motivated by the intention to so. On the surface, it might appear that the formulation of the law was driven by the intention of the Megawati administration to curb the emergence of various abuses of Law No. 22 of 1999, such as rampant corruption and blatant money politics, ethnic parochialism, and the proliferation of excessive taxes which had led to a high cost economy to name some of the most worrying signs. Many perceived that all of these problems were rooted in imperfect laws and the lack of a clearly designed plan (Turner et al. 2003; Legowo 2003; Legowo Djadijono n.d). More compelling is the argument that the attempt was a straightforward act of re-centralization. Such an act is particularly rooted in the nature of decentralization itself, which is not merely as an administrative business, but rather it involves the distributional struggles between national and subnational elites regarding control over local resources (Slater Watson 1989: 511; Montero 2001: 44-45; Hadiz 2003b: 123). Accordingly, meaningful decentralization always faces enormous political obstacles and can be subjected to serious setbacks. One of the salient challenges is the preference of national elites to slow down the process of decentralization and to reinforce their attempts to control it. As Eaton (2001b: 102) suggests, â€Å"national politicians can and do continue to use their legislative authority to modify the initial decision to decentralize†. Thus, for national politicians, â€Å"decentralization is neither inevitable nor irreversible† (Eaton 2001b: 101). I would suggest that the enforcement of the latest Indonesias decentralization lawà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Law No. 32 of 2004à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢perfectly supports this line of argument. This contention is further strengthened by the fact that Law No. 32 restores and strengthens the province and the Ministry of Home Affairs positions in regional affairs at the expense of district governments authority (Eko 2005: 27-29; Ryaas Rashid as cited in Myala 2005). The only new provision within Law No. 32 of 2004 embraced by many as a significant leap in decentralization and local democratization efforts regarded the direct election of heads of regions However, as Fung and Wright argues (2003: 3), the election of both legislative and executive offices are not sufficient to accommodate the influence of local ordinary people on local political processes beyond the election. As the experiences of Bandung and Cirebon attest, there has not been any significant alteration in terms of developing inclusive local political process in the aftermath of the head of region elections. It must be admitted that the promulgation of Local Regulation on Transparency and Participation in Bandung District in 2004 was actually a progressive step in institutionalizing active political involvement of local people. However, it has not been effectively implemented yet. Lack of political will on the part of local to consistently implement the regulation has ensured that it has had only rhetorical value. The claim that popular participation has been channeled through the annual development planning process is specious, since the process is actually still strongly dominated by local government officers. New arrangements in local governance based on Law No. 32 have in fact significantly reduced the power of DPRDs vis-à  -vis heads of regions, since the former no longer have the power to elect and to hold the latter accountable, as regulated in the previous decentralization law. The head of region is now accountable to the central authorities with the president at the apex of the hierarchy. Thus, from a representative democracy point of view, there has been a significant retreat as well. Thus, the lesson seems to be that decentralization in Indonesia has been pursued mainly as a political strategy to fulfill certain political ends, particularly those of national elites within the context of political and economic crisis. Deepening democracy has never been the driving force behind decentralization reform. It is therefore no surprise that we find a lack of political will to realize the democratic potential of decentralization policies at any stage of Indonesias history. Smoke (2003: 12) points out that among the most ubiquitous claims regarding impediments to decentralizations success is the lack of strong political will from various stakeholders involved in the process. Theorists do not all mean the same thing when they talk about ‘political will. For some theorists, strong political will can be seen from the existence of constitutional or legal instruments made by political elites, both national and local (Rondinelli, McCullough Johnson 1989: 77-78; Smoke 2003 : 12). Nevertheless, since many cases also show that decentralization policies cannot attain their intended goals,[2] theorists also emphasize that constitutional and legal instruments are not sufficient to ensure workable decentralization policies. As Isaac (2001: 9) firmly argues, Fundamental reforms cannot be merely legislated. Legislation remains empty phrases unless powerful movements oversee their implementation. Legislation is necessary but not sufficient for decentralization. Accordingly, as Rondinelli (1983: 198-200) highlights, political will must also be measured from the actual realization of those normative arrangements particularly by central political authorities transferring planning, decision-making and managerial authority to lower levels of governments, and also by local political authorities sharing their authority with local citizens through opening up effective channels for political participation so that local citizens, especially the poor and marginalized ones, are able to express their needs and demands and to press claims or national and local development resources. Thus, this dimension of political will is also essential, since in many cases, normative arrangements of decentralization are often used to facilitate political aims that have little to do with devolving power to lower level of governments and utilizing this power to effectively fulfill local peoples needs and demands. As Crook (2003: 85-86) stresses, in some African countrie s the real goal is often to consolidate power through political parties and local elites, or to deliberately neutralize local ethnic challenges through fragmenting â€Å"potential local power bases into smaller, weaker, politically insignificant units†. Based on the above line of thought, the lack of political will in pursuing the democratic potential of Indonesias decentralization can be viewed from different perspectives. Normatively, even though the embrace of the policy may initially be claimed to be an indispensable strategy to develop a democratic system of government, its subsequent adoption within constitutions and some existing decentralization laws as well as their operational regulations in the regions so far has never been clear, firm, and consistent. Neither constitutions nor basic legislation and its subsequent operational regulations explicitly note that promoting local democracy is among the intended goals of decentralization programs. During the New Order era, Development Planning (Perencanaan Pembangunan), which was regulated within the Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation of 1982 (Permendagri No. 9/1982), was claimed to be adopting a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches. Empirically, however, as proven in the experiences of Bandung District and City of Cirebon, the planning process was actually highly centralized and practically excluded public participation. The local governments development planning processes were nothing but breaking down the centrally planned parameters. One might find that this was not the case during the post-Suharto era, particularly with regard to Law No.22 of 1999 and Law No. 32 of 2004. Indeed, some argue that Law No. 22 in particular, was intended to promote local democracy and participation, as evident in its preamble: â€Å"in the implementation of Regional Autonomy is deemed to be necessary to emphasize more the principles of democracy, public participation, equal distribution and fairness, and considering the potential and regional diversity† (Turner et al. 2003: 23; see also, Jaya Dick 2001: 216). However, it appears that further details on how local democracy would be implemented on the ground were actually ill-defined. The national government in fact issued a separate regulation, i.e. Government Regulation No. 68 of 1999 regarding public participation in the governmental process.[3] From the title of the regulation, one might easily assume that it was regarding peoples involvement in the governments policy-making process. But, it was actually not. The regulation was actually more about peoples rights rather than facilitating popular participation. Four rights were mentioned: the right to obtain and give information regarding governmental process; the right to get fair service from the government; the right to give advice to the government policies; and the right to legal protection (perlindungan hukum).[4] Thus, the Government Regulation did not specifically mention that popular participation would be the essential component of the government policy-making process. In addition, knowing that popular participation was framed in terms of rights, it means that it was set on voluntary basis. I believe t hat such setting provided weak encouragement for the public to be engaged in governmental process. In the case of Law No. 32, its prologue reads, †¦local government, which manages and oversees its own governmental affairs based on the principles of decentralization and medebewind (co-operating administration) , is directed towards boosting people welfare through service improvement, empowerment, and popular participation, as well as improving regional competitiveness by taking into account the principles of democracy, equal distribution, fairness, specialness (keistimewaan), and specific characteristics (kekhususan) of a region within the system of Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia. From the above prologue, there would appear to be no significant difference between Law No. 22 and Law No. 32. However, one might argue that central government, as the main architect of the law, showed stronger political will to uphold local democracy in Law No. 32 rather than its predecessor, based on two novel articles within the law, i.e. Article 56 (1) regarding the direct election of head and deputy head of local government and Article 139 (1) which stated that â€Å"Local community has the right to provide input verbally or in writing for the preparation of or during the deliberation of a proposed bill.† Direct election of head and deputy head of local government is undeniably desirable since, as Peterson (1997: 14) argues, indirect elections have â€Å"tended to perpetuate the strength of political insiders, who are often more accountable to their party hierarchy than to the public at large†. Nevertheless, further analysis of other articles reveals that direct el ection of head and deputy head of local government actually lacked democratic orientation in three aspects: first, the election process was practically dominated by political parties maneuvers, especially during the selection of the candidates for head and deputy head of local government, which is prone to power abuse by ‘selling the office to the highest bidder; second, there was strong intervention from national political party boards in determining the candidates; and third, the election gave no opportunity for independent candidates (Legowo Djadijono n.d). Hence, in the end, local communities have become the last component in the whole series of the election process. In other words, the novel provisions regarding the direct election of head and deputy head of local government only left the local community marginalized. More importantly, direct election is insufficient for developing strong local democracy since â€Å"elections occur infrequently and allow for only limited citizen input or feedback regarding specific local concerns or policy options† (Posner 2004: 57). Strong local democracy, Posner argues, needs to be backed up by active political participation of local constituencies beyond the mere act of voting. With regard to Article 139 (1), it appears that popular participation was provided for on a voluntarily basis. What I am pointing out here is that the article indicates that popular participation in local policy making process was not an essential factor in the process. This point is underlined by the fact that there were no other provisions within Law No. 32 which obligated local government institutions to engage the local community meaningfully in the process.

Three Mile Island Case :: essays research papers

5a) If I were on the School Board I would not have agreed to the issue framed for the arbitrator. I believe that the issue was not neutral, rather that it favored the association and Ms. Kimball. Statements in the issue such as, â€Å"...when the grievance absented herself from work for illness...†, support Kimball’s argument. In the Position of the School District section of the handout, the School Board states that when Kimball called in to report the absence she simply informed the district â€Å"that she would not be in.† In my opinion, this should have replaced the prior statement of her calling out â€Å"due to illness†.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  I also think that the School Board should not have agreed to the issue starting with the question â€Å"Was the School District wrong...† this automatically influences the arbitrator to question the School Board’s decision. The issue could have either been changed to impose the question of Kimball being wrong, or to a question of a neutral sort.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  If I were the School Board I would have proposed this issue to the arbitrator:   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   Should Denise Kimball be paid for Tuesday and Wednesday, April 3 and 4, after   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  calling to inform her place of employment â€Å"that she would not be in† due to the   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Three Mile Island Incident of March 30, 1979? I feel that this issue is not only factual but puts weight in the School Board’s argument.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  5b) Although I do not believe that the issue to the arbitrator was fair to the School Board, if I were the arbitrator, I would have ruled for the association and Ms. Kimball. I feel based on the severity of The Three Mile Incident and the fact that Kimball had a legitament note from a physician with a diagnosis of â€Å"environmental stress, emotional stress, and anxiety†, that she should be paid for the days missed. This right is upheld by the Applicable Pennsylvania Statutes: School Laws of Pennsylvania under Section 1154, which is covered in the handout.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  The School Board’s argument of â€Å"she was not sick on the days in question† covered in the Position of the School

Discrimination and Children Essay

Diversity means the differences between individuals and groups in society arising from gender, ethnic origins, social, cultural or religious background, family structure, disabilities, sexuality and appearance. Diversity is more often perceived as a problem when it really should contribute to the community by strengthening relations between human beings. SHC33. 1 pc[1. 1b] – equality Equality means provision of equal access to opportunities and having the same rights as others. Each child needs to be treated as an individual and in this way people caring for it will be able to promote their right of having access to equality of opportunity and of being treated with equal concern. In this way children are able to progress along the pathway of development and learning. Equality of opportunity means that each individual in society experiences opportunities to achieve and flourish which are as good as the opportunities experiences by other people. Equal concern means taking as much care to promote the opportunities and progress of one child as you do for any other child. SHC33. 1 pc[1. 1c] – inclusion. Inclusion represents a process of identifying, understanding and breaking down barriers to participation and belonging. All settings should work towards inclusion, as applying it means that the setting promotes positive aspects of diversity and offers children equal chances in life. SHC33. 1 pc[1. 2] Describe the potential effects of discrimination. Discrimination means treating someone less or more favourably than other people, because they or their family are seen as belonging to a particular group in society. Discrimination can be classified in open discrimination (sexual and racial harassment) and covert or indirect discrimination (favouring one group over another – this often prevents individuals from participating fully in society because of hidden or unspoken rules). The most common bases of discrimination are: 1. Ethnicity/race (based on an individual’s ethnic/racial background) 2. Gender (based on the sex/gender of the individual) 3. Disability (based on an individual having a disability) 4. Social situation (based on social status) 5. Cultural (based on deference in cultural values) Prejudice is a judgement or opinion, often negative, of a person or group, made without careful consideration or accurate relevant information, which may lead to the view that some people are inferior to, or of less worth or significance. Examples of assumptions causing prejudice: Some people are of less value, or inferior to, or of less worth or significance than others (defined by skin colour, gender, impairment, sexuality, appearance); Some people are less capable than others; One culture/religion or social group is superior to another If a family is not a two-parent nuclear family, with parents of different genders and the same ethnicity, it is not â€Å"normal†. Prejudice leads to discrimination. Effects of discrimination in children can be seen as damaged self-esteem, self-image and self-confidence on the psychic side. Effects on health could lead to particularly mental health such as anxiety or depression. Effects on education could lead to not achieving full potential at school, leading to difficulties in gaining employment. Long term prospects of effects on education could mean getting trapped in a cycle of poverty due to poor education and employment opportunities. Relationship difficulties could lead to difficulties in socialising and forming healthy relationships. The potential effects of discrimination can be different for different people. The effects can be physical, emotional or a combination of both. For example children with disabilities may not be given a chance to join in with activities due to others thinking that their disability prevents them from being able to do so. This will make the child feel very different from others.

Free Essays on The History Of Magic Squares

Very little is known about the origin of magic squares. Next to nothing is known about the movement of the idea of a magic square before about 1300 AD. Three cultures are known to have created magic squares, the Chinese, the Indian, and the Arabic. In each culture they were viewed as having supernatural properties. The first magic square in history was created in China by an unknown mathematician, sometime before the first century AD. â€Å"Called the Lo Shu square, it is a magic square of 3 that was said to have appeared on the back of a turtle that came up out of the river. Lo Shu supposedly means "river map," and the story of the appearance of the turtle had to do with a sacrifice to the river god† (http://freespace.virgin.net/mark.farrar1/msqhst01.htm). In 80 AD Ta Tai Li Chi gives the first clear reference to a magic square. In 570 AD, Shuzun gives an actual description of a magic square of 3. Not until 1275 do we hear of the Chinese making squares of order larger than 3. We find the first magic square of 4 in the first century in India by a mathematician named Nagarajuna. â€Å"India is the birthplace of much superior mathematics, and was advanced in many areas of combinatorics at an early date.† (http://freespace.virgin.net/mark.farrar1/msqhst01.htm). The next known date in the Indian development is an 11th or 12th century Jaina inscription that includes a magic square of 4. This particular magic square of 4 has unusual properties not found in other magic squares before that time. The whole class of squares having these properties is called "Jaina squares". â€Å"The first magic squares of 5 and 6 appear in an encyclopedia in Baghdad about 983 AD by Ikhw'n al-Saf' Ras'il, (http://freespace.virgin.net/mark.farrar1/msfmsq01.htm) though several earlier Arab mathematicians also wrote about magic squares. How it came to pass that the Arabs acquired knowledge of magic squares is unknown. It is not known if they invent... Free Essays on The History Of Magic Squares Free Essays on The History Of Magic Squares Very little is known about the origin of magic squares. Next to nothing is known about the movement of the idea of a magic square before about 1300 AD. Three cultures are known to have created magic squares, the Chinese, the Indian, and the Arabic. In each culture they were viewed as having supernatural properties. The first magic square in history was created in China by an unknown mathematician, sometime before the first century AD. â€Å"Called the Lo Shu square, it is a magic square of 3 that was said to have appeared on the back of a turtle that came up out of the river. Lo Shu supposedly means "river map," and the story of the appearance of the turtle had to do with a sacrifice to the river god† (http://freespace.virgin.net/mark.farrar1/msqhst01.htm). In 80 AD Ta Tai Li Chi gives the first clear reference to a magic square. In 570 AD, Shuzun gives an actual description of a magic square of 3. Not until 1275 do we hear of the Chinese making squares of order larger than 3. We find the first magic square of 4 in the first century in India by a mathematician named Nagarajuna. â€Å"India is the birthplace of much superior mathematics, and was advanced in many areas of combinatorics at an early date.† (http://freespace.virgin.net/mark.farrar1/msqhst01.htm). The next known date in the Indian development is an 11th or 12th century Jaina inscription that includes a magic square of 4. This particular magic square of 4 has unusual properties not found in other magic squares before that time. The whole class of squares having these properties is called "Jaina squares". â€Å"The first magic squares of 5 and 6 appear in an encyclopedia in Baghdad about 983 AD by Ikhw'n al-Saf' Ras'il, (http://freespace.virgin.net/mark.farrar1/msfmsq01.htm) though several earlier Arab mathematicians also wrote about magic squares. How it came to pass that the Arabs acquired knowledge of magic squares is unknown. It is not known if they invent...

How to Write SMART Goals and Objectives

How to Write SMART Goals and Objectives The  term SMART goals was coined by in 1954. Since then, SMART goals have become popular with business managers, educators and others because they work. The late management guru  Peter F. Drucker  developed the concept. Background Drucker was a management consultant, professor and the author of 39 books. He influenced many top executives in his long career. Management by objectives was one of his primary business theories. Effectiveness, he said, is the foundation of business, and the way to achieve it is to gain agreement between management and employees on the businesss objectives. In 2002, Drucker received the highest civilian honor in the U.S.- the Medal of Freedom. He died in 2005 at age 95. Instead of creating a Drucker legacy from his archives, Druckers family decided to look forward instead of backward, and they gathered distinguished business people to form  The Drucker Institute. Their mandate, states the institutes website, was to  transform the archival repository into a social enterprise whose purpose is to strengthen society by igniting effective, responsible and joyful management. Though Drucker was for years a successful business professor at  Claremont Graduate University, the institute helped to show how his management ideas- including SMART goals- could be applied to other areas, such as public and adult education. Goals for Success If you have been to a business management class, you have likely have learned how to write goals and objectives in Druckers way: SMART.  If you havent heard about Drucker, you are in for a treat that will help you achieve what you want  and be more successful, whether you are a teacher trying to help your students achieve, an adult learner or a person who seeks to achieve your dreams. SMART goals are: SpecificMeasurableAchievableRealisticTime-bound Writing  SMART  Goals Writing SMART goals for yourself or your students is a simple process if you understand the acronym and how to apply the steps it prescribed, as follows: S stands for specific. Make your goal or objective as specific as possible. Say exactly what you want to achieve in clear, concise words.M stands for measurable. Include a unit of measure in your goal. Be objective rather than subjective. When will your goal be achieved? How will you know it has been achieved?A stands for achievable. Be realistic. Ensure that your goal is feasible in terms of the resources available to you.R stands for realistic. Focus on the end results you desire rather than the activities necessary to get there. You want to grow personally, so reach for your goal- but be reasonable or youll set yourself up for disappointment.T stands for time-bound. Give yourself a deadline within a year. Include a timeframe such as a week, month or year, and include a specific date if possible. Examples and Variations A few examples of properly written SMART goals might be helpful here: Research tuition reimbursement and enroll in a degree program before the next employee review period.Complete a continuing education course in using spreadsheet software by June 1. You will sometimes see SMART with two As- as in SMAART. In that case, the first A stands for attainable and the second for action-oriented. This is just another way to encourage you to write goals in a way that inspires you to actually make them happen. As with any good writing, craft your goal or objective in an active, rather than passive, voice. Use an action verb near the beginning of the sentence, and ensure that your goal is stated in terms you can actually attain. As you achieve each goal, you will be capable of more, and in that way, grow. Personal development is often one of the first things to get deleted from the priority list when life gets hectic. Give your personal goals and objectives a fighting chance by writing them down. Make them SMART, and youll have a much better chance of attaining them.

Business Management & Decision Making Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2000 words

Business Management & Decision Making - Essay Example Strategies can be complicated and the decision-making process has to consider many factors. Ryanair is one such low-cost carrier that entered the market as pioneers in the budget airline industry and adopted a classical airline business model focusing on customer service. Their strategies in different areas like market segmentation, e-relationship with customers, marketing communication, their distinction in offering or abstaining from on-board and ground services have reached them this position. Ryanair, the Dublin based carrier, started its operations in 1991 on the very successful, Southwest Airlines Low Cost Leadership Model. Like most European flights, this airline offers a point-to-point rather than hub service. It offers no frills like seat allocation, meals or frequent flyer programs (SD, 2006). It aims to turnaround flights in 25 minutes and they have the shortest routes. Ryanair’s CEO is an accountant by training but an entrepreneur by inclination and he has amply demonstrated this ability in the success of this airline (Box & Byus, 2007). He has gone against the trade unions, the government officials and the competitors but he has achieved dramatic growth and profitability in this industry. Ryanair flies only Boeing 737s and is currently facing challenges escalating fuel costs, intense competition and regulatory framework in the UK. Despite these challenges, Ryanair has been able to create its own market due to its strategic decision making process. Success in marketing can be achieved by matching the organizational capabilities with the requirements of the marketplace. This matching is based on market segmentation. Expectation based segmentation is a powerful marketing tool in the services sector because it provides knowledge for customer identification, which aids better customer service (Diaz-Martin, 2000). They can tailor their actions to suit the individual requirements. Ryanair followed the expectation based

Jus 102 W-5 Short Paper Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Jus 102 W-5 Short Paper - Essay Example unity police may even indulge in the unethical act of slippery slope which refers to the deterioration of moral values held by police officers after they have been in the profession for a longer period of time (Caldero, 2014, p.145). 2. Police misconduct during undercover operations may take place because of two possible reasons. The first reason is that the police officer that has been hired for such operations had a defected character or was indulged in deviance before being hired (Hall, 2000, p.280). In order to eliminate this factor, the executives need to pay special attention to the background of the applicant while making employment related decisions. Secondly, undercover police officials work in a highly deviant environment. For example, they may have to work with drug dealers and corrupt politicians and this environment corrupts the police official. In order to avoid this source of police corruption, personality tests of police officers should be conducted to identify the strength or the weakness of the police officer to fall pray of deviant activities. 3. The factors that are involved in making decisions regarding the severity of sanctions that are needed to be levied on police officials for indulging in misconducts includes the severity of the misconduct as well as prior incidences of misconducts. If the severity is low and if the police official has been involved in misconduct for the first time then counseling as well as oral counseling that is documented in nature should be used. If the crime is very severe in nature or the police official is a repeat offender then a letter of reprimand should be issued (Colaprete, 2007, p.111). 4. In order to make a complaint regarding the misconduct of a police official and to carry out an investigation against the officials a citizen has to fill a form in which the citizens registers the complaint. After the form has been filled, the senior officer of the department has to analyze and identify the nature of the